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Abstract 
This paper addresses four descriptive research questions. First, is there a direct effect of social 
background on labour market success over and above the effect of own education? Second, 
has this effect declined over time? Third, does it vary depending on the level of education 
achieved and, more precisely, is it weaker among those with higher education. Finally, have 
the returns on education in the chances of access to the upper class (professional and 
managerial occupations) varied over time? These questions are addressed for the Spanish case 
by using comparable social stratification surveys for the years 1988, 1989, 1990-1998, 2005 
and 2006. Three measures of success in the labour market (LM) are considered: labour 
income, a socio-economic index (ISEI) and the chances of access to a given social class. The 
main findings of the paper are that: there is a considerable direct effect of social origin on LM 
success; this effect has not changed (and actually if anything it might have increased) over 
time; and it does not vanish among those with higher education. There is on the other hand 
evidence of credential inflation, such that the same educational qualification provided better 
chances to access the most rewarding occupations in the past, compared to nowadays. Once 
these phenomena and trends are documented, the paper also sets out to investigate possible 
mechanisms underlying the direct effect of social origins on LM success. It, thus, explores 
whether the influence of social origins actually become apparent through the choice of field of 
studies, whether it reflects different abilities captured by performance at school, whether it 
might hinder social skills related to the family of origin or whether it is due to social networks 
used in finding a job. 
Keywords 
Educational Returns, Credential Inflation, Social Origins 
 
 

 1 
Introduction1 
 
Sociologists and economists have long established that education is the key predictor of success in the 
labour market. Social stratification research has also produced solid evidence to show that a strong 
association remains between social origins and the level of education achieved (Breen and Jonsson 
2005). Education is therefore a major channel, probably “the” major channel, through which social 
inequality is reproduced from one generation to the next. Since Blau and Duncan’s classic book in 
1967 and the research based on the so-called “Wisconsin model” it has also long been investigated 
whether and how social origins have an influence on labour market success over and above the effect 
of own achieved education (Blau and Duncan 1967; Jencks et al. 1972; Sewell and Hauser 1975). 
However, when compared to the large amount of research on “the gender wage gap” (Weichselbaumer 
and Winter-Ebmer 2005) and the expanding research field on “ethnic penalties” in occupational 
attainment (Heath and Cheung 2007; Reyneri and Fullin 2011), more recent studies on the direct 
advantage guaranteed by social class of origin in accessing the most rewarding occupations are both 
less frequent and less consensual. In particular, as will be discussed in more detail below, some studies 
point to a declining effect of the direct influence of social origins over time, while others point to 
stability. This paper thus addresses four descriptive research questions. First, is there a direct effect of 
social background on labour market success over and above the effect of own education? Second, has 
this effect declined over time? Third, does it vary depending on the level of education achieved and, 
more precisely, is it weaker among those with higher education (Hauser 1973; Mastekaasa 2011; 
Torche 2011)? Finally, addressing the question on change over time of the direct effect of social 
origins implies also examining whether the direct effect of education on the labour market (LM) 
success has varied. This question in turn leads directly into the large debate on skilled biased 
technological change, educational expansion and returns on education (Goldin and Katz 2008). Have 
educational returns declined over time as a consequence of the fact that higher education has expanded 
faster than the demand for highly qualified workers? Or has skilled biased technological change 
fostered a rising demand for highly qualified workers, thus guaranteeing stable or even increasing 
returns on education? As noted by Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2011) this debate has been largely 
dominated by economists focusing on earnings returns. Therefore it seems timely that sociologists 
who are interested in social stratification contribute to this debate. A straightforward contribution is 
that of broadening the definition of returns on education by also considering returns in terms of the 
chances of access to a given social class (Wright 2005). The main advantage of focusing also on social 
class in the analysis of returns on education, is that class position is less affected by measurement error 
and is a better predictor of life chances and life long earnings when compared to snapshot measures of 
income, which are commonly used by economists (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002). The fourth question 
is, therefore whether returns on education in the chances of access to the upper class (professional and 
managerial occupations) have varied over time.  
 
These questions are addressed for the Spanish case by using comparable social stratification surveys 
for the years 1988, 1989, 1990-1998, 2005 and 2006. Three measures of success in the LM are 
considered: labour income, a socio-economic index (ISEI) and the chances of access to a given social 
class. 
                                                     
1 I wish to thank Gabriele Ballarino, Carlo Barone, the anonymous reviewer of the SPS working paper and the 
other participants to the EDUREU Workshop (held at the EUI on 21-22 June 2012) for the useful comments on 
the previous draft. The financial support of EQUALSOC FP6 project and of the European Consortium for Social 
Research to the creation of the EDUREU Research Group and, in particular, to the EDUREU Workshop held at 
the EUI is also gratefully acknowledged.  
 
Fabrizio Bernardi 
2 
 
The main findings of the paper are that: there is a considerable direct effect of social origin on LM 
success; this effect has not changed (and actually if anything it might have increased) over time; and it 
does not vanish among those with higher education. There is on the other hand evidence of credential 
inflation, such that the same educational qualification provided better chances to access the most 
rewarding occupations in the past, compared to nowadays. Once these phenomena and trends are 
documented, the paper also sets out to investigate possible mechanisms underlying the direct effect of 
social origins on LM success. It, thus, explores whether the influence of social origins actually become 
apparent through the choice of field of studies, whether it reflects different abilities captured by 
performance at school, whether it might hinder social skills related to the family of origin or whether it 
is due to social networks used in finding a job. While the descriptive evidence on associations and 
trends is based on solid evidence from various large data sources, the analysis of the mechanisms is 
much more tentative. The measurement of the various mechanisms is far from optimal and the whole 
spectrum of possible mechanisms cannot be considered. No definite answer can therefore be provided 
on how social origin continues to exert an influence on LM success. At most I will be able to disregard 
some of the most common explanations, thus suggesting where further research might depart from. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections theories and findings from previous studies on 
the direct advantage of class of origin over and above own education are reviewed. In the fourth 
section, a brief description of the evolution in educational participation over time in Spain and the 
parallel change in the occupational structure is provided. Next, data and measurement issues are 
described. In the sixth section, the findings of the study are presented, while the last section 
summarises the main conclusions of the study and puts forward open questions for a broader 
comparative project.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations and previous research 
Classic theories of industrialisation and post-industrialism coincide in assuming a trend from 
ascription to achievement. A central prediction of both theories is that success in the labour market 
will increasingly depend exclusively on own achieved education. Among the processes that are usually 
listed to explain this trend, one finds: the increase in the demand of skilled workers associated with the 
shift of employment from agriculture to industry and then services; the increase in firm size and hence 
in the bureaucratisation of recruitment and internal promotion processes on the basis of education 
credentials used as a screening device by employers; geographical mobility; a general decrease in 
inequality with economic growth; and the spread of an egalitarian ideology associated with the 
development of the welfare state (Ganzeboom and Treiman 2007; Treiman 1970). All these processes 
supposedly strengthen the role of education in determining success in the labour market and reduce the 
direct transmission of advantage across generations. The first working hypothesis is, therefore, that the 
direct effect of social origin on occupational achievement, over and above the effect of own education, 
should have declined in recent decades, while the effect of own education should have increased.  
 
Recent studies have also investigated whether the direct association between social origins on labour 
market success is weaker among those with higher education (Mastekaasa 2011; Torche 2011). It has 
actually been argued that the labour market for the highly educated operates more meritocratically, 
with less space for social origins to exert a direct influence (Breen and Jonsson 2007; Hout 1988). 
Moreover, as has been noted in the research on inequality in educational opportunities, those from 
lower social origins who manage to achieve higher education are likely to be positively selected on 
characteristics such as ability and motivation that are also highly rewarded in the labour market 
(Bernardi 2012; Mare 1993). Also from a life-course perspective one might argue that people who stay 
in school longer start their careers at a later age, when they are less likely to be subject to parental 
influence and control. All in all these three different explanations (meritocracy of LM for the highly 
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educated, positive selection of those who are highly educated from the lower class, and weakening 
parental influence over the life-course) suggest that the social origin advantage (ie the positive 
association between belonging to the upper class and occupational success over and above own 
education), should decline, the higher the level of education achieved.  
With regard to the variation of educational returns over time, most of the research in economics has 
addressed the so-called skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Acemoglu 2002). Its 
empirical starting point is evidence of a widening wage gap in the US between individuals who hold a 
college degree and individuals who do not. In order to explain this gap, scholars focus on market 
competition. The main argument is that the evolution of technology, driven by market competition, 
allows employers to substitute the standardised jobs of poorly educated workers with machines, thus 
raising productivity and lowering the market value of the lowly educated. The same process, however, 
gives more value to the skills of the highly educated, whose work becomes more important in order to 
manage the development of technology, its application to production and the process of marketing 
product and services in an increasingly competitive economy. However, the expansion of participation 
in higher education that has taken place in Europe since the 90s, and the high levels of unemployment 
experienced by young people, even when highly educated, has brought the inflation of educational 
credentials (IEC) hypothesis back into the public debate (Collins 1979). As happens with the 
circulation of money, an increase in the number of higher education qualifications in the population, 
associated with increasing participation, lowers the signaling value of these qualifications to 
employers. Returns on education are thus expected to decrease. One should note that both mechanisms 
described by the SBTC and IEC hypotheses can be active at the same time (Goldin and Katz 2008). 
The observed variation over time of the returns on education will then depend on the interplay 
between the upgrading of the occupational structure, on one side, and the expansion of the population 
with high education on the other side. If the expansion in the supply of highly educated workers 
outstrips the demand, one can expect that returns on education will decrease.  
 
Finally I will consider four plausible explanations of the direct effect of social background on LM 
success. First, I will explore if social class advantage comes about through the choice of different 
fields of study. It has in fact been argued that field of study can be decisive in mediating the effect of 
social origins (van de Werfhorst 2002). Basically, students from upper class families might choose 
more demanding and prospectively more rewarding field of education. The observed effect of social 
origin should therefore vanish once the field of study is also considered. Second, the observed effect of 
social origin can actually reflect class based differences in ability and cognitive skills that are not well 
captured by level of education achieved. Again, once some indicator of ability and cognitive skills is 
considered, the direct effect of social origin should decline and disappear. Third, subjects from 
different social origins might differ in the way they look for and find a job. For instance starting one’s 
own business is more common among those who come from the service class or who have self-
employed parents (Arum and Müller 2004). This might be the case because of the availability of initial 
capital to start up a new business or because they have been socialised into an entrepreneurial culture 
or because they can get direct advice and assistance from the family in the process of setting up the 
new business. If the direct social origin effect actually reflects a difference in the job matching process 
and  one takes into account the ways in  which the job was found, the effect of social origin should 
either disappear or strongly decline. Finally, it has been suggested that the upper class families might 
transmit to their children non-cognitive skills such as self-confidence and social skills that are highly 
valued in certain economic activities. According to (Goldthorpe 2000) such skills should be more 
important and thus more highly rewarded in the service sector than in manufacturing, and particularly 
so in ‘the leisure, entertainment, or hospitality industries, [. . .] high-value sales, customer services, or 
public relations. In the following I will refer to this group as ‘social skills intensive service industries’. 
If Goldthorpe’s (2000) argument is true, one can then expect that the effect of social origin should be 
stronger in the aforementioned industries.  
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3. Previous research 
 
A direct origin effect on labour market success over and above own education is reported by the large 
majority of studies on EU countries (for UK: (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2011; Goldthorpe and Mills 
2008); for Germany: (Grätz 2011; Müller et al. 1998); for Norway: (Hansen 2001; Mastekaasa 2011); 
for Sweden: (Erikson and Jonsson 1998); for France: (Vallet 2004); for Italy: (Bernardi 2003; Zella 
2010));  
 
A direct comparison of the size of the estimates of the direct origin effect produced in the 
aforementioned studies is not possible due to different measurement of the dependent variable in terms 
of earnings, income, occupational status and class of destination. There are also differences in model 
specifications and statistical analyses. Still, the size of the direct origin effect is not at all trivial. For 
instance, in Britain having service class origin when compared to an unskilled working class 
background, provides a 14 percentage points advantage in accessing the service class, net of the effect 
of own education. For Norway, Hansen (2001) found that those with managerial/executive origins 
expect on average 15 percent higher earnings than those originating in the working class, again 
controlling for own education. This result from Norway has been confirmed in a more recent study by 
Mastekaasa (2011) that shows that the earnings for someone at the top of the parental earnings 
distribution is expected to be 9.4 percentiles higher in the destination earnings distribution than for 
someone at the bottom of the parental earnings distribution. The comparative study of 12 EU countries 
by (Iannelli 2002), table 6) shows that the increase in the occupational status of the first job for young 
people who have parents with tertiary education when compared to those with lower secondary 
education or less, again net of own achieved education, ranges from about 4 ISEI points in Sweden 
and Finland, to about 7 points in Spain, Greece, Romania and Hungary. 
 
On the other hand, no direct effect of social origin on earnings and occupational education have been 
found in the US by studies based on the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (Warren et al. 2002). Similarly 
van der Werforst (2002) reports no direct effect of class of origin on class of destination for Dutch 
men. One should note however, that Torche (2011) for the US and (Ganzeboom and Luijkx 2004) for 
the Netherlands do document a direct effect of social origin on class of destination.  
 
The discrepancy in the findings on whether the origin effect has declined over time is even larger. 
Again this might be due to differences in the measurement of the dependent variable, and/or in model 
specifications. Additionally, there is variation in the time span under consideration. A decrease is 
reported for Sweden, between the late 1960s and early 1990s (Jonsson 1996), in the Netherlands 
between the 1920s and the 1980s (De Graaf and Kalmjin 2001; Jonsson 1996), and in Germany 
(Müller et al. 1998). More recent studies however report no variation over time for the class of origin 
effect on class destination for the cohorts 1948, 1958 and 1970 in Britan (Bukodi and Golthorpe 
2011), and in Norway for direct influence of parental earnings on own earnings for the cohorts 1955-
1969 (Mastekaasa 2011). 
 
Recent evidence for the conditional effect of social background on the level of education achieved is 
also not fully consistent. Hout (1988) original finding that importance of social origin declines for the 
highly educated, was confirmed in Norway (Mastekaasa 2001), while Torche’s (2011) in depth study 
for the US documents a U shape pattern, so that the direct parental influence is stronger among those 
with low educational attainment and those with advanced university degrees, while it disappears 
among bachelor’s degree-holders. 
 
With regard to changes in returns to education over time and credential inflation for the US there is 
also solid evidence that the earnings premium associated with tertiary education when compared to 
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lower education has increased dramatically since 1980. A number of influential studies have argued 
that the sharp increase in the college/high school earning premium is the result skill biased 
technological change (SBTC) that disproportionally rewards highly skilled occupations and of the 
concomitant rise of low paid service jobs for those who are less qualified, combined with the erosion 
of LM institutions that traditionally protected the earnings of those in the lower tier of the LM 
(Acemoglu 2002; Autor et al. 2008).What seems critical in this respect is that while the relative supply 
of college workers in the US has declined since the early 80s, as a consequence of slowing educational 
attainment for the cohorts born after 1949 and of the smaller size of recent cohorts entering the labour 
market, the relative demand for college graduated - attributable to skills biased technical change, has 
constantly increased (Golding and Katz 2008). For European countries in the 80s and early 90s there is 
no clear pattern in the trend of the earning premium (Harmon et al. 2001). A more recent comparative 
study reports however lower earning returns on education for younger cohorts (Middendorf 2008).	
 
Fewer comparable results are available if one considers returns on education in terms of access to a 
given social class. Braun et al. (1997) find a slight decline in occupational returns in absolute terms for 
Germany, France, the UK and Hungary between the early 80s and early 90s. However, in relative 
terms, compared to the chances of lower qualified school leavers, university graduates have preserved 
if not strengthened their competitive advantage2. More recent studies have updated these findings. 
Absolute probabilities of attaining the service class for university graduates in Germany have 
remained stable throughout the 1990s and have increased in the 2000s. Relative returns (measured as 
log-odds ratios of attaining service class) for university graduates when compared to Abitur holders 
are relatively stable from the 1990s. The suggested explanation for declining absolute returns on 
tertiary education in the 1980s and stable and increasing absolute returns in the 1990s and 2000s is 
that in the 1980s educational expansion proceeded faster than occupational upgrading, while 
educational expansion has been very limited since the 1990s (Klein 2011), 8-10). A recent study for 
the UK that compares three cohorts (1946, 1958 and 1970), shows that absolute returns on accessing 
the managerial and professional occupations are stable for those with higher tertiary education, and 
have increased for those with lower tertiary education (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2011). On the other 
hand, the relative returns of tertiary education, both and higher and lower, have partly declined when 
compared to upper secondary education. The main explanation for these findings is that the growth of 
the managerial and professional occupations have largely exhausted the supply of highly qualified 
personnel, so that even people with upper secondary education have gained more access to them in 
more recent cohorts. An almost opposite pattern has been reported for the Netherlands where absolute 
returns on education have declined between 1960 and 1991, in particular for those with upper 
secondary education; but relative returns on tertiary education, compared to upper secondary, have 
increased (Wolbers et al. 2001).  In this case, the explanation is that the upgrading of occupational 
structure in the Netherlands has not kept up with the great expansion of education. To sum up, 
previous research suggests that absolute and relative returns on education depend on the interplay 
between educational expansion and occupational upgrading. With this lesson in mind, I now turn to 
examine the Spanish case. 
 
 
                                                     
2 Absolute returns refer to the proportion among those with a given educational level who reach a specified class 
position. Relative returns are based on the comparison between the proportion of those who have a given 
educational level (for instance higher education) who reach a specified class position and the equivalent 
proportion of those with a different educational level (for instance low education). The distinction between 
absolute and relative returns seems critical in order to test the prediction of the credential inflation and the SBTC 
hypotheses. It is sufficient to mention here that while credential inflation refers to absolute returns on education, 
SBTC is usually dealt with in terms of relative returns. 
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4. Educational expansion and occupational upgrading in Spain 
Hannan el al. (1997) in a widely cited paper, classify the Spanish educational system as being at an 
intermediate level of standardisation and stratification. In other international comparative projects the 
Spanish educational system has even been pictured as being highly standardised (see for instance 
(Golsch 2003; Ianelli and Soro- Bonmatí 2003). If one sticks, however, to the original definition set 
out by (Allmendinger 1989), the Spanish educational systems seems to have moved from a high level 
of standardisation and stratification for the cohort of students that the entered school in the aftermath 
of the civil war (1936-1939) to a low level of standardisation and stratification, in more recent years3. 
With regard to the stratification dimension, until the 1970 LGE (Ley General de Educación; General 
Education Law) reform, students had to pass a selective exam at the age of ten and were accordingly 
sorted into two separate tracks, one of which led to secondary education, while the other might be 
described as a ‘dead-end track’ because it offered no possibility to continue onto further education. 
With the 1970 reform the track system was abolished, and a comprehensive system of compulsory 
education until the age of 14 was introduced. The comprehensive character of the Spanish educational 
system was further strengthen with an additional reform (LOGSE - Ley Orgánica de Ordenación 
General del Sistema Educativa; Organic Law on the General Organisation of the Educational System) 
in 1990, when, with the socialist party in government, the compulsory age of schooling was raised to 
age 16. After achieving the basic level of compulsory education a student can now choose between the 
academic-oriented upper secondary track (two years) or vocational training (one and a half years). At 
this branching point, there is no orientation or selection process based on previous grades by which a 
student might be refused access to post-compulsory education. Although there are a significant 
number of private non-subsidised schools, tuition is free both in public schools and in subsidised 
private schools. These schools jointly account for about 85 per cent of students enrolled in post-
compulsory education. Moreover, those who opt for vocational training still have a chance to attend 
higher vocational education by passing some complementary training modules (a “bridging course”) 
or by moving back to the academic track and then eventually going on to university. Since 1990 two 
additional reforms of the educational systems have been approved, in 2002 and 2006, but neither of 
them have altered the comprehensive structure of the Spanish educational system.  
 
With regard to the standardisation dimension, since the 1990 LOGSE reform, the organisation of the 
educational system has been decentralised and is now the responsibility of the 17 Autonomous 
Communities (AC) that make up the Spanish state. Therefore it is now up to the discretion of the 
educational authorities of each AC to establish a substantial part of the curricula in the various phases 
and cycles. For instance, at the level of primary and secondary education 65 per cent of the content of 
the curricula is defined by the Ministry of Education at the national level, while the remaining 35 per 
cent is set at the level of the AC (55 per cent/45 percent if the AC has its own co-official language). 
Second, the competitive examinations to become teachers vary from one autonomous community to 
another. And, more importantly, although the formal criteria for having to retake a course are set at 
national level, the standards and levels of selectivity in the application of the law differ from one AC 
to another (Bernardi and Requena 2010). 
 
As far as the occupational structure is concerned, in the second half of the 20th century Spain has 
moved from being characterised by a very large agricultural sector to a configuration that is more 
characteristic of post-industrial societies. According to the labour force survey 20% of working people 
were still employed in the primary sector in 1977; but the figure dropped to 5% in the first three 
quarters of 2007. Changes in the occupational structure have been described as an “asymmetrical 
polarisation”: strong growth in the top tier of the employment structure, moderately strong at the 
                                                     
3 According to Allmendinger (1989, 233) standardisation refers to “the degree to which the quality of education 
meets the same standard nation wide”. What is important in this regard is whether curricula are nationally 
defined, whether teacher training is uniform, whether there is a national standardised examination system, and 
whether there is no large variation in funding across schools and universities. 
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bottom and extremely weak in the middle (Bernardi and Garrido 2008). The occupations that have 
most expanded are those that require a university degree (such as professionals and technicians) on the 
one hand, and unskilled jobs in the construction and consumer sector on the other hand. In spite of the 
expansion of occupation for the highly qualified, Table 1 below suggests that educational expansion 
has grown at a faster rate than the creation of highly qualified jobs in the labour market. The table 
presents the educational distribution of different birth cohorts (upper panel) and the occupational class 
of the first job achieved by the same birth cohorts (bottom panel). While 10% of those born between 
1940-1950 achieved a university (short or long) degree, 12% of this group obtained a first job in the 
upper class (class I-II in the the EGP class scheme). However for those born between 1971-1980 the 
proportion of university degree holders has risen to 30%, while only 20% of them managed to find a 
job in the upper class. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The lack of balance between supply and demand is reflected in the supply-demand ratio for 
highly qualified workers at entry in the labour market, presented in the lower row of the table. 
It is evident that starting from the 1951-60 birth cohort, the supply of highly qualified people 
has been greater than the growth in opportunities for them to find a job in the upper class.  
 
 
5. Data and variables 
The empirical analysis is largely based on a social mobility survey undertaken in Spain in 2006 by the 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS). A national representative sample (N=7,671) was 
interviewed and detailed information on current and first job, education and social origins was 
collected.4 Immigrants are excluded from the present study since for the years under analysis in Spain 
they are almost exclusively first generation and the study of the direct effect of education and social 
origin for first generation immigrants implies additional complications that cannot be properly 
addressed here. The analytical sample is therefore made up of native born citizens, aged 28-65. All the 
analyses are replicated separately for men and women and for those aged 28-45.  
 
I consider three dependent variables that refer to respondent’s LM success: occupational class, 
occupational status (measured as ISEI Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996)), and monthly net labour 
income. The analysis for labour income is limited to those who were employed at the time of the 
survey; while the analysis for occupational class and occupational status refer to the current job for 
those employed at the time of the survey or the last job, or for those who were unemployed or inactive 
with some prior work experience5. 
 
With regard to the occupational class, I study the probability of access to the service class 
(professionals and managers, class I and II in the EGP class scheme) and, in a separate analysis the 
                                                     
4 Immigrants are excluded from the present study since for the years under analysis in Spain they are almost 
exclusively first generation and the study of the direct effect of education and social origin for first generation 
immigrants implies additional complications that cannot be properly addressed here. 
5 I have also replicated the analysis on occupational class and status restricting the sample to those who were 
employed at the time of the survey and the results do not change. Note that in 2006 the unemployment rate for 
those aged 28-45 was very low. One might expect that including those not employed at the time of the survey 
might affect the results in times of high unemployment, such as that of the current big crisis. It would then 
become particularly interesting to study the direct effect of social origin on employment. For 2006 no direct 
effect of social origin on the probability of being employed over and above own education is found (results not 
shown here but available on request). 
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probability of avoiding the working class; broadly defined to include both skilled and unskilled 
manual occupation in the agricultural, industry and service sector (EGP IIIb, V-VI-VIIab). Education 
is coded in seven categories: primary or less, lower secondary, lower vocational training, upper 
secondary, higher vocational training, tertiary education (short degrees) and tertiary education (long 
degrees, masters and doctoral studies). The social class of origin is based on the father’s occupation 
when the respondent was 16. If the father was missing then respondents were asked about their 
mother, or other heads of household. Social class of origin is coded in six categories using the EGP 
class scheme: service class, white collars (IIIa), small employers with and without employees, self-
employed farmers (IVc), urban working class (IIIb, V-VI-VIIa) and agricultural workers (VIIb). I will 
generally focus on the comparison between the service class and the urban working class. Descriptive 
statistics for education, social origins and the four dependent variables (i.e. access to the service class, 
avoidance of the working class, ISEI and labour earnings), are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
By drawing on the CIS 2006 survey it is also possible to investigate different mechanisms that might 
underlie the direct effect of social origins. One can in fact test whether the direct influence of social 
origins on occupational success comes about through the choice of field of studies, whether it reflects 
different abilities captured by performance at school, whether it might hinder social skills related to 
the family of origin, or whether it is due to social networks used in finding a job (van der Werfhorst 
2002; Mastekaasa 2011). Details and descriptive statistics for the variable used to operationalise each 
of these mechanisms are also provided in Appendix 1.  
 
With regard to change over time I examine the variation in the social origin direct effect on the first 
job for various birth cohorts, included in the CIS 2006 survey. I also investigate changes in the social 
origin direct effect from 1988 to 2006 using several Spanish mobility surveys. I have thus employed 
the CIS 1988 and CIS 1989 surveys, both with samples of over 27,000 cases. The Encuesta Socio-
demografica in 1991 is the largest and most detailed social mobility survey ever undertaken in Spain, 
with a sample of over 150,000 cases. This has been the traditional data source for social mobility 
studies in Spain (Ballarino et al. 2009; Carabaña 1999). For the years 1990-1999 I have also merged 
the “The Public Opinion of Spaniards” monthly survey data, collected by ASEP. These are repeated 
surveys with samples of around 1,200 individuals every month (the resulting N is 101,237). Finally for 
2005 I have analysed the Spanish EUSILC module on intergenerational reproduction of inequality 
(N=28,829). All the aforementioned surveys provide information on education, current or last 
occupation and social origins. The merged data sets make for a total analytic sample of 346,809 cases 
6. 
 
When comparing the effect of social origin in these different surveys, the analysis is limited to the 
probability of accessing the service class. No income information is available in the older surveys, and 
differences across surveys in the coding of occupations might bias more finely grained measures of 
occupational success, such as the ISEI. On the other hand, identifying the professionals and 
managerial occupations that make up the service class is straightforward. There are also some 
differences in the original coding of education across surveys that impede the use of a common 
detailed classification. In the CIS 1989 and EU-SILC, primary education also includes those with 
uncompleted primary education. There are also some discrepancies in the coding of primary and lower 
secondary across surveys, due to changes in the structure of the educational system over time. A more 
serious limitation is that there is no separate information for the vocational training tracks in the CIS 
1988 survey and EU-SILC 2005. Note however that since the dependent variable is access to the 
service class, what seems particularly relevant is the distinction between short university degree and 
                                                     
6 In Appendix 2 I discuss issues of coding and comparability across surveys in details. Various tests suggest that 
the measurement of occupational class and education is fairly consistent in the various surveys, and that it is 
legitimate to interpret substantively (and not simply as due to measurement errors) the change in the coefficients 
of interest across surveys. 
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long ones. This distinction is available for all surveys with the exception of EU-SILC (2005). Faced 
with these difficulties in the empirical analysis, I have followed two strategies. First, I have estimated 
models with the most detailed classification available for education in each survey. Despite the 
aforementioned discrepancies, each survey uses rather detailed coding of at least 6 categories. In this 
way I have sought to minimise within each survey the part of the social origin effect that might be due 
to measurement error in own education. Then, I have replicated the analysis using a four level 
common classification that distinguishes lower secondary education or less, upper secondary or 
vocational training, lower tertiary education, and longer tertiary education. In any case, in commenting 
on the results I give special weight to the contrast between the SD 1991 and the CIS 2006 because 
they are the most comparable surveys, with the most detailed measurement of education, occupational 
class and class of origin.  
 
With regard to the statistical models, I use linear probability models for the analysis of occupational 
class (access into the service class and avoidance of the working class) with robust standard error and 
OLS regression for monthly labour earnings and ISEI, again with robust standard errors. I have 
performed a wide range of robustness checks with different models and specifications. They include: 
a) the estimation a logit model instead of a LPM for the analysis of occupational class; b) the 
estimation of an OLS regression with a log transformation of labour income; c) the estimation of an 
ordered logit for labour income recoded into 10 ordered categories7; d) the estimation of a quantile 
regression for labour income; c) the replication the analysis of occupational class and ISEI only for 
those employed; and e) the replication of the analysis separately for men and women and for the 
youngest cohort (28-45). The complementary analyses confirm that the findings presented in the 
following section are robust8.  
 
6. Results 
Table 2a and Table 2b address the question on whether at the beginning of the 21st century in Spain 
there is a direct effect of social background on labour market success over and above the effect of own 
education. Table 2a studies the social origin advantage for the chances of accessing the service class 
and avoiding of the working class, while Table 2b does the same for monthly net earnings and 
occupational status (ISEI). Is there, then, a direct effect of social background on labour market 
success? The straightforward answer is “yes” and this effect seems sizeable for the four measure of 
LM success considered. If one considers the chances of accessing the service class, those who 
themselves come from the service class enjoy an advantage of 13 percentage points when compared to 
those who have working class origins9. The premium of having upper class origins instead of working 
class roots rises to 23 percentage points among young (28-45 years old) respondents. If one considers 
the monthly net labour income, the premium for young male respondents with a service class 
background is equal to 213 euros per month (model 2 table 2b). The confidence interval for this 
estimate is large. Still, in substantive terms about 200 additional euros a month seems a rather 
substantial amount of money. For income I have also estimated a quantile regression that shows that 
                                                     
7 Between 0 and 300€, 301€ and 600€, 601€ and 900€, 901€ and 1200€, 1201€ and 1800€, 1801€ and 2400€, 
2401€ and 3000€, 3001€ and 4500€, 4501€ and 6000€, 6001€ or more. These categories were suggested in the 
CIS 2634 questionnaire for those who could not, or did not want to, provide a precise value for their monthly 
income. 
8 Overall I have results from about 200 regression models that are far from the 2 millions regressions of Xala-I-
Martin (1997) but they are still too many to be presented even in an internet appendix. Therefore only part of the 
results of the robustness checks are presented in Appendix 3, while the others can be reproduced using the Stata 
commands that are available for replication.  
9 Only 1.2% of the predicted values based on the LPM fall out of the interval 0 and 1. The estimated service 
class advantage in terms of the marginal effect in the equivalent logit model is 9%  
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the class of origin advantage is largely concentrated in the top quantiles. More precisely, while the 
direct class advantage is almost null in the lowest to the median quantile (about 25 to 75 euros) it is 
already large in the 0.75 quantile (160 euros) and very large (400 euros) in the 90th percentile (See 
Appendix Table 3.1)10. I will return to this finding later on, commenting on the conditional effect of 
class of origin for the highly educated and those employed in the social skills intensive service sector. 
However for the moment, three additional findings stand out.  
 
First, the class of origin advantage is stronger for men than for women. This finding is consistent 
across all the measures of occupational success considered. Second, the class of origin advantage tends 
to be stronger for young respondents (those aged 28-45). Third, if one compares model 1 to 3 and 
models 3 to 6 in Table 2a, it transpires that the effects of class of origin are greater for avoiding a 
downward move (models 3 to 6) into the working class than for moving upward into the service class 
(model 1 to 3). The exception from this general pattern is of course for those with a service class 
background, for whom accessing the service class is the only possibility to avoid a downward move. 
 
[TABLE 2A AND 2B ABOUT HERE] 
 
The evidence of a sizeable class of origin presented in Table 2a and Table 2b already speaks against 
the hypothesis drawn from the modernisation theory that would predict a null or trivial direct effect of 
social origin in contemporary Spain. A stricter test of modernisation theory, however, requires us to 
examine the trend of the direct class premium and whether it has declined over time. I have therefore 
performed two analyses. First, I have studied the variation in the class of origin premium on the first 
job across various birth cohorts from 1940 to 1978. Second, I have focused on the current or last job, 
and I have compared the estimates of the class premium based on different mobility surveys from 
1988 to 2006.  
 
Table 3 shows the results for the probability of accessing the service class in the first job. The upper 
panel presents the estimates based on the CIS 2634 survey, while the bottom panel those based on the 
SD 1991 survey. The main conclusion that can be drawn from Table 3 is that there is no evidence of a 
decline over time in the advantage of those coming from a service class background in the chances of 
accessing the service class, net of education. This effect has even increased from 2 per cent to 13 per 
cent, if one compares the 1941-1950 and the 1970-1978 in the CIS 2634 survey. There is however 
considerable uncertainty associated with these estimates and the variation is not statistically 
significant. Also the findings based on SD 1991 survey point to a stability over time, although in this 
case a statistically significant increase, from 5 per cent to about 10 per cent, is found if one compares 
the effect associated with having a service class background in the first birth cohort 1930-1939, and 
those following11.  
                                                     
10 I have also estimated OLS regressions models with a log transformation for income and ordinal probit model 
with income coded in deciles (Appendix 3.2 and 3.3). A class of origin advantage is also found with these 
different model specifications on the whole sample of men and women aged 28-66. In both specifications, 
however, the effects turns out to be statistically insignificant for men and women aged 28-48. One should note 
that logging the monthly income produces a scale that is far more sensitive to differences when values are small, 
than when they are large. On the other hand, the quantile regression shows that most of the class of origin 
advantage is concentrated among those in the top part of the income distribution. This pattern is accentuated 
among younger respondents. My conclusion is that logging income artificially squeezes the class of origin 
advantage. Similarly, in the case of the ordered logit there is clear evidence that the proportionality assumption is 
violated. 
11 One has to stress, that the results of the two surveys are not directly comparable because the definition of the 
first job varies. In the CIS 2634 the first job is defined as the first job with a duration longer than six months, 
while no tenure restriction was considered in the SD 1991. This might explain why the estimates of the class 
premium are larger in the SD 1991. If those with a working class family are more likely to take up occasional 
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another important finding, which can be seen in Table 3, is that the relative returns of tertiary 
education in accessing the service class have declined over time. While in the cohort 1940-49 those 
with a short university degree had a probability of accessing the service class that was 62 percentage 
points higher than those with a lower secondary education, in the subsequent birth cohorts this 
advantage has declined to about 45 percentage points. In the most recent birth cohort 1970-1978 one 
also finds a decline in the relative returns of a long university degree (including doctoral studies). In 
the cohort 1940-49 a long university degree secured an advantage of 67 percentage points in accessing 
the service class, when compared to a lower secondary. This advantage has now gone down to 52 
percentage points. All the aforementioned variations are statistically significant (see Appendix, Table 
3.4).  
 
Table 4 addresses the same question on variation of time of the direct effect of social origin, but in this 
case considering cross sectional data with information on the current or last job at different points in 
time. As explained above, I have employed the most detailed classification for education in each 
survey. With all due caveats related to possible measurement errors across surveys, the results overall 
are consistent with those found for the first job, and there is no evidence of a decline in social class of 
origin premium over time. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Once established that there is a social origin advantage (i.e. a sizeable advantage in LM success for 
those coming from the service in class), and that it has not declined over time, in Table 5 I investigate 
whether this social origin advantage is conditional on the level of education achieved. Additionally 
Table 5 allows us to discover whether the absolute returns on education have changed over time. I 
focus on this last question first. The effect of cohorts in Table 5 now expresses the variation in the 
probability of accessing the service class for a given educational level when compared to the birth 
cohort 1940-49. For instance for someone born between 1970-1978 a short university degree is 
associated with a probability of finding a first job in the service class that is 21 percentage points 
lower than for someone born in 1940-1949 with the same level of education. In other words, Table 5 
documents that an inflation in the value of short tertiary education has occurred. In other words, that 
same level of education guarantees lower chances of access to the upper class. A similar inflation is 
also evident for long university degrees in the most recent cohort. When compared to the cohort 1940-
49, long university degrees lose 14 percentage points. 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Returning to the question regarding the conditional effect of social origin, there are good reasons to 
expect that the direct social origin effects should be weaker among those who are highly educated. As 
discussed in section 2, it has in fact been suggested that the LM for university gradates is more 
meritocratic and leaves less space for social origin influences in occupational attainment (Hout 1988; 
Breen and Johnsson 2007). Furthermore the transition into the LM for those who are highly educated 
takes place at an older age, when the family of origin is less able to exert a direct influence on the 
individual life-course. Finally a positive selection on unobserved characteristics, such as motivation 
and ability, which are also highly rewarded in the LM, is likely to be in place for those who achieve 
higher education from working class origins (Bernardi 2012).   
 
(Contd.)                                                                    
jobs, for instance while studying, while those from a service class family tend to land directly into the service 
class, this would result in a larger class premium in the SD 1991. 
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Although each of these arguments seems plausible, the evidence in Table 5 for the probability of 
accessing the service class in the first job, is not in line with the hypothesis of a vanishing social class 
advantage among those with tertiary education. One actually finds that there is no class of origin 
difference among those with a short university degree. However, a sizeable effect is found among 
those with a long university degree and those with upper secondary or higher vocational training. 
These findings seem therefore to point to a U shape pattern that resembles that found for the US by 
Torche (2011). The picture however becomes more complex when different measures of occupational 
success associated with current and or last jobs are considered.  
 
Next, I perform a similar analysis for the current or last occupation and I analyse the chances of access 
to the service class, and of avoiding the working class (Table 6ab). I also examine whether the effect 
of class of origin on net monthly labour income and ISEI varies by education (Table 6cd). 
 
[TABLE 6 A, B, C, D ABOUT HERE] 
 
A slight decline in the social origin effect is observed for the chances of avoiding the working class 
and for the ISEI. However this decline mainly seems to be driven by a roof effect. For instance, since 
already 91 per cent of those with a long university degree coming from a working class background 
manage to avoid the working class (see the effect of the constant in model 5 Table 6b), there is little 
space left for the service class origin advantage to materialise.  
 
On the other hand, in the case of income, all social class advantage is concentrated among those with a 
long university degree12. One should note in this respect that in Spain there is a minimum earning’s 
regulation, and that salaries among the unskilled skilled and skilled workers and white collars are 
largely set by collective agreements; while the top tier of the labour market is less regulated and more 
market or performance driven. It is therefore common knowledge that the variation in earnings 
between two managers or lawyers is higher than the variation in earnings between two unskilled or 
skilled workers. Indeed there is evidence that performance pay incidence is most prevalent among 
those with a university degree and those employed in high wage categories (De la Rica et al. 2010) 13. 
One can then speculate that with performance pay there is more space for the family of origin 
advantage to materialise.  
 
In sum, there is no univocal pattern for the conditional effect of social origin on the level of education 
achieved. Still, the evidence for Spain does not support the hypothesis that university education is the 
great equaliser and that social background does not influence success in the LM for those who manage 
to achieve a university degree. Quite the opposite: in the case of labour income the class of origin 
makes a difference only among university graduates.  
 
Finally, in the last part of the analysis I tentatively look at various mechanisms that might be 
underlying the social origin advantage documented so far. First of all I investigate whether the 
observed direct class of origin effect is due to the choice of different fields of study. It is well known 
that some fields of study (for instance engineering) lead to higher returns in the LM when compared to 
others (for instance humanities). The observed class of origin advantage might then simply reflect the 
choice of different fields of study, so that students from the upper class embark on more demanding 
fields of studies that give access to better paid occupations. If this is the case, when then the 
information of field of study is brought into the analysis, the observed class of origin advantage should 
                                                     
12 The same pattern of results is observed if one restricts the analysis to men aged 28-45 (See Appendix 3, Tables 
3.5abcd). 
13 The incidence of performance pay is about 30% among those with a university degree and 14% among those 
with primary education (own computation based on Table 2a in de la Rica et al. 2010). It reaches 50% and 30% 
among managers and professionals, respectively.  
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vanish or at least decline. Table 7 however shows that the direct effect of social origin on access to 
class, income or ISEI does not vary at all when fields of study (whose effects are not shown here) are 
controlled for. One can also disregard the Spanish case, in line with Mastekaasa’s (2001) findings for 
Norway that the direct effect of social origin on LM success comes about through different choices in 
fields of study14. 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 8 addresses two other possible mechanisms underlying the class of origin advantage on labour 
income. The observed advantage of those with service class origin might actually reflect class related 
differences in ability that are not well captured by the level of education. Or it might also be related to 
class-specific ways of finding a job. In model 2 in Table 8 I add an indicator of performance at school 
at the end of compulsory education. This indicator is far from optimal since it is based on a 
retrospective question on school performance, rather than registered grades or test scores. Model 2 
shows that performance at school pays off, on the top of the level of education completed. Someone 
who had a “not good” or a “bad performance” earns on average about 200 euros less than someone 
who had a very good performance. Still, in model 2 there is hardly any variation in the estimates of the 
direct social origin effect. This finding casts serious doubts on the idea that the observed class of 
origin premium might reflect differences in performance at school and indirectly class based 
differences in ability. This result is also in line with what was found in UK, where the class of origin 
advantage is robust to the inclusion of an indicator of ability at school (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2011). 
Next, Model 3 examines whether class based differences in ways to find a job might account for the 
observed class premium. In this case one can appreciate some reduction in the class of origin effect 
once the way to find a job is considered, particularly in the case of those from self-employed families. 
Indeed those whose parents were self-employed or farmers are more likely to have set up their own 
business, while those coming from the service class are more likely to have found their job through a 
public examination (results not shown here). Both methods lead on average to higher earnings than 
relying on personal contact. Still, the reduction in the class premium from model 1 to model 3 is not 
large (26 euros for the urban self-employed) and the estimates are not precise enough to make firmer 
conclusions (i.e. the difference between the class of origin effect in model 1 and 3 are not statistically 
significant).   
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, in Table 9 I explore whether the class advantage is conditional on the sector of employment. I 
distinguish across five sectors: public sector, agriculture, industry, social skills intensive service 
activities and the remaining service activities where social skills should be more important, and 
service activities where social skills should be less important. According to Goldthorpe (2000) such 
skills should be more important and thus more highly rewarded in the service sector than in 
manufacturing, and particularly so “in the leisure, entertainment, or hospitality industries, [. . .] high-
value sales, customer services, or public relations”. Mastekaasa (2011) operationalises Goldthorpe’s 
intuition and defines industries in cultural services, hotel and restaurant services and financial services 
as social skills intensive industries. In the following I use a slightly broader definition to also include 
real estate services, bookkeeping and consultancy services, public relations, computer services, 
advertising and market research services and other services to firms 15. In this way I create two 
                                                     
14 The analysis has been replicated for cohort and gender subgroups and no variations in the class of origin effect 
is observed once fields of study are considered (results not reported here). 
15 This corresponds to the industries 70, 71, 72, 73 and 4 in the CNAE 1993. I cannot use a more refined 
classification because the coding used in CIS 2634 collapses all these industries into a single category. While 
some of them, such as public relations activities, would certainly fit Goldthorpe’s (2000) argument, other such as 
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segments of the service sector: the first that includes those that I define as social skills intensive, while 
the second segment includes those remaining, (i.e. retail trade, transport, education, health, activities 
of membership organisations, personal services). I also separate the public sector.  
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Model 1 in Table 9 shows that, controlling for own education and gender, the sector of employment 
does affect earning. In particular, those employed in “other services” and those employed in 
agriculture earn on average less than those employed in the social skills intensive segment of the 
service sector. The direct effect of social origin is not however affected by the inclusion of the sector 
of employment (compare with model 1 Table 7), thus suggesting that the advantage conferred by the 
class of origin does not come about by the placement in a given sector of activity. Model 2 includes 
interaction between class of origin and sector of employment. The constitutive term for social class of 
origin in model 2 now refers to those employed in the social skills intensive sector. For those with a 
service class and self-employed family of origin the class premium raises to 347 and 455 euros on 
average, respectively. On the other hand the interaction terms for these two aforementioned class of 
origins and the remaining sectors have a negative sign. The level of uncertainty associated with these 
estimates is high, as the ample confidence intervals show. Still, this pattern of findings is in line with 
the social skills hypothesis since almost all the observed advantage in terms of income for those 
coming from the service class and from self-employed parents is concentrated among those who are 
employed in the social skills intensive service sector. 
 
There is however an important caveat to make in this respect. The social skills intensive service sector 
also turns out to be the sector with the largest income dispersion (see Table 6 in the Appendix). While 
in this sector the average income is slightly smaller than in the public sector (1,346 euros compared to 
1,427 euros) the standard deviation is 1.5 times higher (1026/675). It might therefore be the case that 
the observed class premium is due to the largest income dispersion in the sector and not to class based 
social skills that are more highly rewarded in that sector. For whatever reasons besides class based 
social skills, those from the service class and self-employed families might be better equipped to profit 
from the larger variability of income in this sector. In order to grasp the mechanism underlying the 
findings of model 2 one would then need a more fine grained analysis within the occupations of each 
sector 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
7.1 Conclusions: summary of the results for Spain 
The empirical analyses commented on above have addressed multiple questions related to the direct 
advantage of class of origin on LM success, over and above the indirect effect that it guarantees 
through educational achievement. To recap, this paper has analysed variation in the direct class of 
origin advantage over time and across level of education. The parallel question on variation in absolute 
and relative returns to education has also been touched on. Finally, I have presented some tentative 
suggestions on various mechanisms that possibly underlie the persistent direct intergenerational 
transmission of inequality. Table 10 summarises the main findings of the statistical tour de force  
across the various empirical analyses presented above. 
 
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
(Contd.)                                                                    
computing are more questionable. Since the sample size is too small to keep these categories apart, I have 
preferred to include them in the social skills segment. 
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Moving right from the first column of Table 10, I find a social origin advantage over and above own 
education. Those from the service class have 13% more chances of achieving service class when 
compared to someone from the working class with the same level of education. This class advantage 
rises to 23% among male respondents aged 28-45. They can also expect to earn on average 213€ more 
than those with working class origin with the same level of education. The size of these effects is 
substantial. To benchmark these findings, it is worth noting that the “ethnic penalty” in avoiding the 
unskilled occupation for a first generation man from Morocco living in Spain, in the period 2002-2007 
was 27 percentage points. In other words, taking into account the level of education and time spent in 
the Spanish labour market the chances of being employed in skilled occupation were 27 percentage 
lower for a Moroccan male worker than a Spanish worker (Bernardi et al. 2011, Table 11). The ethnic 
penalty for other ethnic groups was also about 30%. If one then compares the chances of avoiding 
unskilled occupation for two people, with the same level of education but different class of origin, the 
class penalty for those with a working class background is 23% (Table 2a, model 2). Therefore the 
size of the “class of origin penalty” is close to the “ethnic penalty” for first generation immigrant 
workers.  
 
Second, contrary to the expectation of modernisation theory there is no evidence of a decline of this 
class advantage over time. If anything, there are even some hints of an increase in the most recent 
cohorts, when compared to the cohort of birth 1940-1949 (see Table 3). Parallel to this, both relative 
and absolute returns on education have declined (see Table 4 and 5). The reduction in the absolute 
returns on education is particularly notable. This means that in recent years the same level of 
education guarantees lower chances of accessing the upper class when compared to the past. A short 
university degree is now associated with a probability of finding a first job in the service class that is 
21 percentage points lower than the same probability for someone born in the 1940-1949 cohort with 
the same level of education. Not too surprisingly the decline in both the absolute and relative 
advantage associated with university education has occurred when the supply of university graduates 
has outstripped their demand (Table 1).  
 
Fourth, various arguments suggest that the class premium would reduce for people with higher levels 
of education. This should occur if the LM for the highly educated is more meritocratic and/or the class 
effect is reduced for those who enter the LM at older ages. It could also be the case that the upper class 
might actively try to influence their offspring occupational attainment particularly in case of a failure 
in the educational system and/or those from working class background who achieve higher education 
are particularly bright and motivated  (i.e. they are positively selected on unobserved characteristics 
that are also rewarded in the LM). Contrary to the shared prediction of these arguments, no reduction 
in the class premium is found for higher levels education in Spain. In the case of income, the class of 
origin advantage is actually only found for those who are highly educated. In this respect one should 
note that the variability in the income distribution is highest among those who are highly educated (the 
standard deviation for the income distribution of those with a long university degree is almost double 
that for for those with a higher secondary education). This result begs the question of whether higher 
income variability among university graduates is exogenous to the class of origin effect. I will come 
back to this issue below in the section “open questions”. For the time being it is sufficient to point out 
that in this case the results for Spain differ from those for Norway, where a reduction of the direct 
parental influence for university graduates has been found, and from those for the US, where direct 
parental influence is strong among those with low educational attainment; and it disappears or 
substantially weakens among bachelor degree-holders but re-emerges among advanced degree-
holders, so that a U shape pattern is observed (Torche 2011; Mastekaasa 2011). 
 
A tentative analysis on possible mechanisms shows that there is no mediating effect of field of study, 
confirming previous results by Mastekaasa (2011), nor of grades at school (although the measure is far 
from optimal) - nor of the modes used for finding the job. On the other hand, the class advantage 
appears to be stronger in the segment of the service sector where social skills are presumably more 
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important. This last finding mirrors previous results for Norway and is in line with Goldthorpe’s 
(2000) claim that the social class of origin effect should appear more clearly for those employed in 
sectors where social skills play a more important role. Incidentally, however, it turns out that income 
dispersion is also higher in this segment of the service sector, where the direct parental influence is 
stronger. Therefore this finding matches the previous result that pointed to stronger parental influence 
among university graduates who have larger income dispersion.  
 
7.2 Conclusions: open questions 
This paper is a good example of how research can be seen as perennial endeavour where the answer to 
a question leads to more fine grained questions.  
First, there is solid evidence that the class of origin is more important in determining LM success for 
men than for women. This result is in line with what has been established in the past, when social 
mobility and class maintenance for women was predominantly guaranteed through marriage. But why 
is this the case nowadays? Gender equality has made giant (or at least large) steps forward, even in 
Spain. Furthermore the divorce rate is rising in all OECD countries, and Spain is not an exception in 
this respect (Bernardi and Martínez-Pastor 2011). It does not seem a fully rationale strategy nowadays 
to invest in one’s own daughters’ marriage as a social mobility strategy. One alternative explanation 
for the weaker class of origin effect for women is that of a stronger self-selection process into female 
employment. Only those who are most motivated, or who have the most favourable unobserved 
characteristics among women with a working class background, are employed. ‘Therefore one would 
expect that the estimated direct social background effect for women would be underestimated. If 
however the observed gender effect is not due to self-selection, one should first come to grips with the 
actual mechanism that underlies the direct parental influence, and then try to identify its gendered 
nature.  
 
Second, a stronger direct parental influence is associated with greater income dispersion. This finding 
is consistent with what we know from an introductory course on regression, so that the larger the 
variance on the dependent variable, the larger the beta coefficients for the independent variable; in this 
case the class of origin. Far from simply being a regression artefact, this rule has a clear substantive 
implication  for the problem under analysis: the greater the labour income inequality, the stronger the 
direct parental influence. In other words, when there are possibilities to earn more, those who come 
from a privileged background seem to be better equipped to take advantage of them. This 
interpretation rests on the assumption that the income distribution is exogenous to the influence of the 
class of origin. But the class background effect might be responsible for the observed dispersion in 
income. This explanation would be compatible with the idea that distribution of social skills varies 
according to the class of origin. In particular, those from the service class possess more social skills 
that make them more productive (and thus worth being more highly rewarded) especially in specific 
economic sectors. The question whether the observed pattern is due to a polarisation in unobserved 
characteristics across social classes, or to differing income producing wage settings across sectors or 
segments of the labour force might boil down to a trivial chicken-egg question. On the one hand, in a 
situation of perfect income equality, no background effect would be observed by definition. Or to put 
it differently, the more variability the more potential for class of origin based inequality. On the other 
hand, class of origin might on its own have a disequalising effect on the income distribution. If social 
classes become increasingly different with regard to some characteristics that are related to 
productivity, the larger income dispersion would simply reflect more skill polarisation across social 
classes. Both supply and demand mechanisms might well be at play simultaneously. Nevertheless, the 
in-depth exploration of the stronger effect of class background where the income variations is larger 
might pay-off theoretically. It would in fact address the core of the relationship between income 
inequality and income mobility, a topic largely ignored by sociologists (Björklund and Jäntti 2008). 
 
A third, final question that arises from the previous results is what happens next or, to be more precise, 
now  Social mobility studies have usually a five to ten year lag with respect to the society they 
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analyse16. This study is no exception since it is largely based on a mobility survey undertaken in 2006. 
This is usually not a major problem given the slow pace of social change. However the financial crisis 
in 2008 might represent a discontinuity with the past. If one does not want to make a contribution to 
the understanding of past, the question on the consequences of the financial crisis on social mobility 
then becomes a pressing one. Do the findings for the younger cohort 1970-1980 in this study hold 
today? Although the long term effect on social mobility patterns will become evident only over time, 
once the mobility trajectories of current generations have completely unfolded, one can still speculate 
on the direct parental influence in the new scenario of economic and fiscal crisis. In times of economic 
hardship one can expect social background to become more relevant. In Spain, as in other countries, 
the economic crisis has brought the unemployment rates to unprecedented high levels. In 2011 the 
youth unemployment level is about 40%. One might argue that in a situation of high unemployment, 
the direct advantage conferred by the class of origin is displaced by the chances of having, or not 
having, a job. 
 
7.3 Conclusions: Preliminary hypothesis for a comparative research study 
As the saying goes “The third conclusion is the lucky one”. As a way to confirm this saying, I have 
merely sketched some general hypotheses for a comparative research project based on the conclusions 
of this study. First of all, one would expect a larger effect of the class of origin on income in those 
countries with larger income inequality. This would be a generalisation of the specific pattern 
observed for university graduates and for those employed in the social skills intensive service sector in 
Spain. Second, one would expect a larger effect of the class of origin on the probability of access to 
the service class in those countries with a smaller service class. In this case one can foresee fiercer 
competition to guarantee class maintenance over generations. Third, the variation in the relative and 
absolute returns on higher education will depend on the supply demand ratios for the highly educated 
(such as the ratio presented in Table 1). Four, smaller direct effects of the class of origin should be 
observed in country with highly stratified educational systems such as Germany and Denmark if the 
intergenerational reproduction of inequality takes place mainly through the educational system. 
Conversely a large class effect should be observed in a country with a comprehensive educational 
system (such as in the case of Spain or Italy) that conveys less clear signals on school leavers’ 
productivity in the labour market, and leaves more space to the family of origin to exert an influence 
(Bernardi et al. 2004). Fifth, a more gender neutral effect of parental influence should be observed in 
countries with more gender equality. 
 
Addressing these preliminary hypotheses (and others that might emerge along the way) requires a truly 
comparative set of results for different countries. One would then be in a privileged position to 
scrutinise the pivotal role of education and class of origins in structuring inequality across generations 
and countries. This would be the great pay-off of a comparative study along the guidelines established 
in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 Thus, the analyses in Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) arrive to the 1980s, while those in Breen (2004) to the 
1990s. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Educational Attainment and Access to the Service Class in the First Job by 
Cohort of Birth; Spain  
 
CIS 2634 (2006) 
 
 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 
Level of education      
Primary or less 79.4 57.9 29.9 11.0 4.5 
lower seconday 7.4 18.3 28.7 34.7 28.1 
lower vocational 1.6 3.8 5.6 9.0 8.4 
Upper secondary 3.8 6.8 13.6 11.6 13.7 
Upper vocational 2.4 2.6 4.9 10.1 15.6 
University short 3.1 5.1 8.4 9.5 13.7 
University long 2.2 5.5 8.9 14.1 16.0 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N= 863 977 1059 1394 1371 
Class of first job 
(EGP)      
Service class 6.5 12.0 14.8 18.4 20.6 
White Collars 9.1 14.5 20.2 21.0 26.1 
Self-employed 6.7 6.5 6.8 5.8 4.5 
Farmers 9.7 4.6 2.9 2.3 1.2 
Urban working class   56.1 56.1 51.5 48.0 44.3 
Agric. working class 11.8 6.4 3.7 4.5 3.4 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N= 626 849 988 1334 1342 
 
Ratio university (short+long) 
/ class I-II     
 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 
      
Source: CIS 2634 
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Table2a: Class of Origin Effect on the Probability of Access into the service class (P(Y)), 
ISEI and on Income, Controlling for Own Education; OLS Regression with Robust 
StandardE; 95% Confidence Intervals in Brackets. Linear Probability for P(Y) Models 
and OLS for ISEI and Income. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 P(access service class) P(avoiding the unskilled working class) 
 All Men aged 28-
45 
Women aged 
28-45 
All Men aged 
28-45 
Women 
aged 28-45 
Gender 
(male=1) 
0.01   0.02   
 [-0.01,0.03]   [-0.01,0.04]   
Education       
Primary or less -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.04 
 [-0.03,0.01] [-0.04,0.01] [-0.03,0.05] [-0.09,-0.00] [-0.11,0.09] [-0.14,0.05] 
Lower 
secondary. (ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lower voc. 
training  
0.04* -0.00 0.12** 0.11** 0.06 0.19** 
 [0.01,0.07] [-0.04,0.04] [0.04,0.19] [0.04,0.17] [-0.04,0.16] [0.07,0.30] 
Upper sec. 0.08** 0.08* 0.04+ 0.26** 0.20** 0.27** 
 [0.05,0.12] [0.02,0.14] [-0.01,0.09] [0.21,0.32] [0.10,0.30] [0.17,0.37] 
Upper voc. 
training  
0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.19** 0.12* 0.28** 
 [0.10,0.19] [0.07,0.21] [0.07,0.20] [0.13,0.25] [0.03,0.21] [0.18,0.38] 
University short 0.57** 0.55** 0.52** 0.54** 0.51** 0.60** 
 [0.51,0.62] [0.46,0.65] [0.43,0.61] [0.49,0.59] [0.42,0.59] [0.51,0.68] 
University long 0.67** 0.63** 0.70** 0.59** 0.54** 0.69** 
 [0.62,0.71] [0.56,0.71] [0.62,0.77] [0.55,0.63] [0.47,0.61] [0.62,0.75] 
Class of origin       
Service class 0.13** 0.23** 0.09+ 0.16** 0.23** 0.11** 
 [0.08,0.18] [0.14,0.31] [-0.00,0.18] [0.11,0.21] [0.15,0.31] [0.03,0.19] 
White collars 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.15** 0.23** 0.08 
 [-0.01,0.10] [-0.03,0.16] [-0.02,0.17] [0.09,0.21] [0.13,0.33] [-0.02,0.19] 
Self-employed 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.15** 0.19** 0.10** 
 [-0.02,0.04] [-0.03,0.07] [-0.04,0.08] [0.11,0.19] [0.12,0.27] [0.03,0.18] 
Farmers 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.15** 0.20** 0.12* 
 [-0.02,0.04] [-0.06,0.05] [-0.03,0.10] [0.10,0.20] [0.10,0.30] [0.02,0.22] 
Urban working 
class (Ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural 
working class 
-0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05* -0.06 0.04 
 [-0.03,0.01] [-0.04,0.06] [-0.06,0.07] [-0.09,-0.00] [-0.15,0.03] [-0.06,0.15] 
Constant 0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.26** 0.23** 0.18** 
 [0.01,0.07] [-0.01,0.05] [-0.01,0.03] [0.21,0.31] [0.18,0.28] [0.13,0.23] 
N 3768 1133 1026 3768 1133 1026 
Source: CIS 2006 + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table2b: Class of Origin Effect on the Probability of Access into the Service Class 
(P(Y)), ISEI and on Income, Controlling for Own Education; OLS Regression with 
Robust Standard Errors; 95% Confidence Intervals in Brackets. Linear Probability for 
P(Y) Models and OLS for ISEI and Income. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Income ISEI 
 All Men aged 
28-45 
Women 
aged 28-45 
All Men aged 
28-45 
Women 
aged 28-45 
Gender (male=1) 460**  460** 2**   
 [403,518]  [403,518] [1,2]   
Education       
Primary or less -192** 4 -88 -3** -2 -2 
 [-291,-93] [-332,339] [-233,56] [-4,-1] [-4,0] [-5,1] 
Lower secondary. 
(ref.) 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lower vocational 
training  
72 38 45 3** 3* 5** 
 [-42,185] [-159,236] [-89,178] [2,5] [0,5] [1,8] 
Upper secondary 174** 120 123+ 9** 7** 10** 
 [88,260] [-27,267] [-12,259] [8,11] [5,10] [7,13] 
Upper vocational 
training  
205** 187* 120 9** 7** 10** 
 [113,297] [32,341] [-24,264] [7,10] [5,9] [7,13] 
University short 366** 266** 411** 21** 22** 21** 
 [278,453] [103,428] [273,549] [19,22] [19,25] [18,23] 
University long 821** 672** 630** 29** 28** 30** 
 [695,947] [464,879] [480,780] [27,30] [25,30] [28,33] 
Class of origin       
Service class 145* 213+ 90 5** 8** 3+ 
 [28,262] [-13,438] [-59,240] [4,7] [5,11] [-0,6] 
White collars -55 -135+ 107 2+ 3* 2 
 [-160,50] [-294,24] [-57,272] [-0,4] [1,6] [-1,6] 
Self-employed 152** 193* 93 2** 3** 2* 
 [53,251] [7,379] [-25,211] [1,4] [1,5] [0,5] 
Farmers -42 -27 -18 -1 -3* 2 
 [-129,46] [-199,145] [-128,93] [-2,1] [-5,-0] [-1,5] 
Urban working 
class (Ref.) 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural 
working class 
-98* -59 -83 -3** -1 -2 
 [-174,-22] [-225,108] [-188,22] [-4,-1] [-4,1] [-5,1] 
Constant 950** 1245** 794** 33** 33** 31** 
 [817,1082] [1138,1353] [675,913] [32,35] [32,35] [30,33] 
N 2211 859 638 3768 1134 1028 
Source: CIS 2006 + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Class of Origin Effect on the Probability that the First Job is in the Service 
Class, by Birth Cohort. Linear probability models; Panel a uses CIS 2634 (2006), panel 
b uses SD (1991) 
 
 
Panel a CIS 2634 (2006) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1930-39 1940-49 1950-69 1960-69 1970-78 
Education      
Primary or less -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** 0.03 
 [-0.08,0.02] [-0.05,0.02] [-0.03,0.02] [-0.05,-0.01] [-0.03,0.09] 
Lower secondary. (ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lower vocational training  0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 
 [-0.13,0.24] [-0.05,0.13] [-0.04,0.08] [-0.03,0.06] [-0.02,0.08] 
Upper secondary 0.07 0.13* 0.10** 0.04 0.04 
 [-0.06,0.20] [0.01,0.24] [0.03,0.16] [-0.01,0.09] [-0.01,0.09] 
Upper vocational training  0.16 0.16+ 0.10* 0.10** 0.15** 
 [-0.08,0.40] [-0.01,0.34] [0.00,0.21] [0.04,0.17] [0.09,0.21] 
University short 0.69** 0.62** 0.47** 0.41** 0.45** 
 [0.49,0.90] [0.47,0.77] [0.36,0.59] [0.31,0.50] [0.36,0.54] 
University long 0.43** 0.67** 0.64** 0.61** 0.53** 
 [0.15,0.71] [0.53,0.81] [0.53,0.75] [0.53,0.69] [0.44,0.62] 
Class of origin      
Service class 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08+ 0.13* 
 [-0.09,0.29] [-0.11,0.14] [-0.07,0.16] [-0.01,0.18] [0.03,0.23] 
White collars 0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.09+ 
 [-0.12,0.33] [-0.11,0.24] [-0.20,0.03] [-0.06,0.10] [-0.01,0.19] 
Self-employed  0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.04 
 [-0.04,0.07] [-0.04,0.08] [-0.08,0.03] [-0.05,0.05] [-0.02,0.10] 
Farmers 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-0.03,0.04] [-0.04,0.03] [-0.05,0.04] [-0.06,0.04] [-0.08,0.06] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 
 [-0.02,0.03] [-0.06,0.02] [-0.04,0.05] [-0.08,0.03] [-0.03,0.10] 
Constant 0.03 0.04+ 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 [-0.03,0.09] [-0.00,0.09] [-0.03,0.04] [-0.01,0.06] [-0.04,0.03] 
N 573 740 868 1179 970 
 
Panel b SD (1991) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-66 
Education     
Primary or less -0.02* -0.04** -0.02** -0.01** 
 [-0.05,-0.00] [-0.06,-0.03] [-0.03,-0.01] [-0.01,-0.00] 
Lower secondary. (ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lower vocational training  0.06** 0.04* 0.01 0.03** 
 [0.02,0.10] [0.00,0.07] [-0.01,0.03] [0.01,0.05] 
Upper secondary 0.09** 0.07** 0.05** 0.06** 
 [0.05,0.13] [0.04,0.10] [0.03,0.07] [0.04,0.07] 
Upper vocational training  0.09** 0.17** 0.10** 0.13** 
 [0.03,0.16] [0.11,0.24] [0.07,0.13] [0.09,0.16] 
University short 0.57** 0.62** 0.59** 0.50** 
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Panel b SD (1991) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-66 
 [0.51,0.63] [0.58,0.66] [0.56,0.62] [0.46,0.55] 
University long 0.69** 0.68** 0.68** 0.65** 
 [0.62,0.75] [0.64,0.72] [0.65,0.70] [0.61,0.69] 
Class of origin     
Service class 0.05** 0.10** 0.10** 0.12** 
 [0.02,0.09] [0.08,0.13] [0.07,0.12] [0.09,0.16] 
White collars 0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.07** 
 [-0.03,0.07] [0.00,0.07] [0.01,0.05] [0.04,0.11] 
Self-employed 0.00 0.01 0.03** 0.02+ 
 [-0.01,0.02] [-0.01,0.02] [0.02,0.04] [-0.00,0.04] 
Farmers -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 [-0.01,0.00] [-0.01,0.01] [-0.01,0.01] [-0.02,0.01] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 [-0.01,0.01] [-0.01,0.01] [-0.01,0.00] [-0.01,0.01] 
Constant 0.03* 0.05** 0.03** 0.02** 
 [0.01,0.05] [0.03,0.06] [0.02,0.04] [0.01,0.03] 
N 15088 14540 22443 12283 
Note: 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Bold if change over time is statistically significant when compared to cohort 1941-1950 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Table 4: Change Over Time of the Class of Origin Effect on the Probability of Access 
into the Service Class; People Age 28-45 in Different Years; 95% Confidence Intervals 
in Brackets; Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis of Different Social Mobility Surveys. 
Linear Probability Models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years 
(Cohort of birth) 
1988 
(1943-60) 
 
1989 
(1944-61) 
1991 (SD) 
(1946-63) 
1998-9 
(1953-71) 
2005 (SILC) 
(1960-77) 
2006 
(1961-78) 
Class of origin       
Service class 0.14** 0.13** 0.08** 0.08** 0.14** 0.16** 
 [0.08,0.20] [0.07,0.18] [0.06,0.09] [0.04,0.12] [0.09,0.19] [0.09,0.22] 
White collars 0.05 0.04 0.05** 0.03 0.06** 0.07* 
 [-0.02,0.11] [-0.01,0.08] [0.03,0.07] [-0.01,0.07] [0.02,0.10] [0.00,0.14] 
Self-employed 0.01 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.02 0.02 
 [-0.03,0.04] [-0.03,0.03] [0.00,0.02] [-0.03,0.03] [-0.01,0.05] [-0.02,0.06] 
Farmers -0.02+ 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 [-0.04,0.00] [-0.02,0.02] [-0.02,-0.01] [-0.03,0.01] [-0.02,0.04] [-0.03,0.06] 
Urban working class 
(ref.) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural working class -0.01 -0.02* -0.02** 0.00 -0.03** 0.01 
 [-0.03,0.01] [-0.03,-0.00] [-0.03,-0.01] [-0.02,0.02] [-0.05,-0.01] [-0.03,0.05] 
N 6447 6159 37959 5102 7859 2159 
       
Note: Controlling for gender and the most detailed classification for education in each survey 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Cohort and Class of Origin Effect on the Probability that the First Job is in the 
Service Class by Level of Education, CIS 2634 (2006). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Primary Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
(short and 
long) 
Cohort       
1930-39 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.20 -0.05 
 [-0.02,0.01] [-0.05,0.08] [-0.18,0.11] [-0.18,0.30] [-0.50,0.10] [-0.24,0.13] 
1940-49t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1950-59 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.20* -0.06 -0.12+ 
 [-0.01,0.03] [-0.05,0.02] [-0.18,0.04] [-0.38,-0.01] [-0.23,0.10] [-0.25,0.00] 
1960-69 -0.01* -0.01 -0.08 -0.23** -0.06 -0.12* 
 [-0.03,-0.00] [-0.04,0.03] [-0.18,0.02] [-0.40,-0.06] [-0.21,0.09] [-0.23,-0.01] 
1970-78 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.21* -0.14+ -0.16** 
 [-0.02,0.11] [-0.05,0.01] [-0.16,0.04] [-0.37,-0.04] [-0.29,0.02] [-0.27,-0.05] 
Class of origin       
Service class 0.05 0.05 0.11* 0.01 0.13* 0.10* 
 [-0.05,0.15] [-0.05,0.14] [0.02,0.21] [-0.13,0.14] [0.02,0.25] [0.01,0.18] 
White collars 0.11 -0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.09 0.03 
 [-0.04,0.26] [-0.05,0.05] [-0.02,0.16] [-0.21,0.12] [-0.06,0.23] [-0.08,0.14] 
Self-employed 0.02+ -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.04 
 [-0.00,0.05] [-0.04,0.01] [-0.05,0.06] [-0.15,0.13] [-0.05,0.20] [-0.05,0.13] 
Farmers 0.02* -0.03* -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.04 
 [0.00,0.04] [-0.05,-0.00] [-0.11,0.02] [-0.20,0.18] [-0.13,0.23] [-0.09,0.17] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.31** 0.08 -0.19+ 
 [-0.01,0.02] [-0.04,0.02] [-0.08,0.16] [-0.52,-0.09] [-0.29,0.44] [-0.40,0.02] 
Constant 0.00 0.05** 0.17** 0.74** 0.68** 0.69** 
 [-0.01,0.02] [0.02,0.09] [0.07,0.27] [0.57,0.92] [0.51,0.85] [0.57,0.82] 
N 1299 1471 853 399 506 905 
Note: 
Controlling for gender 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 6a: Class of Origin Effect on the Chances of Access to the Service Class, Avoiding 
the Working Class, income and ISEI, Conditional to the Level of Education, CIS 2634 
(2006); Controlling for Age and Gender 
 
Panel A: access to the service 
class  
(2) (3) (4) (5)  
Linear probability models Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 0.08+ 0.16** 0.13+ 0.13* 0.15** 
 [-0.01,0.17] [0.04,0.27] [-0.01,0.27] [0.03,0.24] [0.07,0.23] 
White collars 0.03 0.10* 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 [-0.03,0.10] [0.00,0.20] [-0.16,0.18] [-0.13,0.16] [-0.09,0.13] 
Self-employed 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 [-0.02,0.03] [-0.05,0.07] [-0.12,0.17] [-0.12,0.14] [-0.07,0.12] 
Farmers 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.04 
 [-0.02,0.02] [-0.07,0.11] [-0.29,0.14] [-0.04,0.29] [-0.09,0.18] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.01 0.02 -0.22 0.02 -0.15 
 [-0.03,0.01] [-0.10,0.15] [-0.48,0.05] [-0.34,0.38] [-0.38,0.07] 
Constant 0.03** 0.11* 0.69** 0.71** 0.69** 
 [0.01,0.05] [0.01,0.21] [0.52,0.86] [0.54,0.88] [0.57,0.81] 
N 2198 754 350 466 816 
 
 
Panel B: avoiding working 
class 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5)  
Linear probability models Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 0.13+ 0.19** 0.13** 0.07* 0.10** 
 [-0.01,0.28] [0.07,0.31] [0.04,0.22] [0.01,0.13] [0.05,0.15] 
White collars 0.23** 0.13+ 0.12* -0.00 0.06+ 
 [0.10,0.36] [-0.00,0.25] [0.02,0.21] [-0.09,0.09] [-0.01,0.13] 
Self-employed 0.20** 0.14** 0.06 0.03 0.05+ 
 [0.14,0.26] [0.04,0.23] [-0.04,0.16] [-0.04,0.10] [-0.01,0.11] 
Farmers 0.19** 0.07 -0.10 0.05 -0.01 
 [0.13,0.25] [-0.05,0.19] [-0.28,0.09] [-0.03,0.13] [-0.11,0.09] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.04+ -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
 [-0.09,0.01] [-0.29,0.06] [-0.28,0.18] [-0.36,0.22] [-0.25,0.11] 
Constant 0.19** 0.67** 0.86** 0.91** 0.88** 
 [0.15,0.24] [0.55,0.80] [0.75,0.97] [0.81,1.01] [0.80,0.95] 
N 2198 754 350 466 816 
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Panel C: Income (2) (3) (4) (5)  
OLS Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 87 81 -18 325* 292** 
 [-81,255] [-112,273] [-163,128] [65,584] [107,477] 
White collars 21 -44 28 -84 -31 
 [-162,204] [-225,137] [-152,209] [-340,172] [-202,140] 
Self-employed 125+ 95 132 342+ 253* 
 [-12,261] [-48,237] [-127,391] [-14,697] [17,490] 
Farmers -40 -105 29 -140 -7 
 [-144,63] [-268,57] [-177,234] [-568,288] [-291,276] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural working class -131** -30 -61 -236 -277* 
 [-213,-50] [-321,261] [-371,248] [-543,71] [-518,-36] 
Constant 710** 1127** 1685** 2247** 2013** 
 [617,803] [893,1360] [1377,1993] [1551,2943] [1579,2446] 
N 1126 495 249 341 590 
 
 
Panel D: ISEI (2) (3) (4) (5)  
OLS Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 7** 7** 5** 3+ 5** 
 [3,11] [3,10] [1,9] [-0,6] [3,8] 
White collars 4* 2 2 -1 1 
 [0,7] [-1,5] [-2,6] [-6,3] [-2,4] 
Self-employed 3** 3* 2 -0 2 
 [1,5] [0,5] [-2,6] [-4,4] [-1,4] 
Farmers -1+ -0 -4 4 1 
 [-3,0] [-4,3] [-11,4] [-1,9] [-4,6] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural working class -3** -2 -5 -4 -6 
 [-4,-2] [-7,3] [-14,5] [-16,8] [-14,2] 
Constant 32** 45** 55** 63** 58** 
 [30,33] [42,48] [50,60] [57,68] [54,61] 
N 2197 755 350 466 816 
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Table 7: Class of Origin Effect on the Access to the Service Class, Net Monthly Income 
and ISEI. The Model Controls also for Level of Education by Field of Study (83 
categories), Gender and Cohort of Birth; CIS 2634 (2006) 
 
 Access to service class Income ISEI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  + field of 
study 
 + field of 
study 
 + field of 
study 
Class of origin       
Service class 0.13** 0.12** 145* 143* 5** 5** 
 [0.08,0.18] [0.07,0.17] [28,262] [23,263] [4,7] [4,7] 
White collars 0.05 0.07* -53 -43 2+ 3** 
 [-0.01,0.10] [0.01,0.12] [-158,52] [-158,72] [-0,4] [1,5] 
Self-employed 0.01 0.02 151** 140** 2** 3** 
 [-0.02,0.04] [-0.01,0.04] [52,249] [40,239] [1,4] [1,4] 
Farmers 0.01 0.01 -36 -32 -1 -1 
 [-0.02,0.04] [-0.01,0.04] [-123,51] [-122,57] [-2,1] [-2,1] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural working class -0.01 -0.01 -90* -101* -2** -3** 
 [-0.04,0.01] [-0.03,0.01] [-166,-14] [-178,-23] [-4,-1] [-4,-1] 
N 3768 3768 2211 2211 3768 3768 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 8: Class of Origin Advantage in Net Monthly Income,  
Controlling also for Performance at School and Way to Find the Current Job 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  + grades at school + way to find the current job 
Class of origin    
Service class 145* 142* 138* 
 [28,262] [25,259] [22,255] 
White collars -55 -54 -64 
 [-160,50] [-159,51] [-167,38] 
Self-employed 152** 148** 126* 
 [53,251] [50,246] [28,224] 
Farmers  -42 -47 -89+ 
 [-129,46] [-135,40] [-180,1] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0 0 0 
Agrica.ltural working class -98* -97* -107** 
 [-174,-22] [-172,-21] [-184,-31] 
Grades at school    
Very good  0  
  [0,0]  
Good  -171**  
  [-299,-43]  
Not good  -249**  
  [-380,-119]  
Bad  -185*  
  [-348,-23]  
Very bad  20  
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 (1) (2) (3) 
  + grades at school + way to find the current job 
Class of origin    
  [-378,418]  
Missing  -281+  
  [-568,6]  
Way to find last job    
Personal contacts (ref.)   0 
Application to job announcement   18 
   [-57,93] 
Employment office   64 
   [-24,152] 
Public examination   206** 
   [118,293] 
Job is the family business   97 
   [-35,230] 
Started his/her own business   254** 
   [111,396] 
Other   2 
   [-104,108] 
Missing   -157 
   [-457,143] 
_cons 950** 1159** 886** 
 [817,1082] [1004,1313] [753,1019] 
N 2211 2211 2211 
pseudo R2 0.26 0.27 0.27 
Controlling for education and gender 
95% confidence intervals in brackets; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 9: Class of Origin Effect Conditional to the Sector of Employment  
 
 (1) 
income 
(2) 
income  
Class of origin     
Service class 144* [28,260] 347* [0,693] 
White collars -55 [-159,49] -143 [-393,106] 
Self-employed 169** [71,267] 455* [67,843] 
Farmers -27 [-116,63] 234 [-157,625] 
Working class 0 [0,0] 0 [0,0] 
Agricultural laborers 144* [28,260] 347* [0,693] 
Sector     
Public sector (1) -12 [-134,109] 82 [-29,193] 
Agricultural (2) -209** [-359,-59] -37 [-252,179] 
Manufactory (3) -10 [-145,124] 181* [31,330] 
Social skills intensive service 
sector (4) ref. 
0 [0,0] 0 [0,0] 
Other services (5) -180** [-310,-50] -33 [-173,107] 
Interactions     
Service class * sector (1)   -120 [-498,257] 
Service class * sector (2)   -577** [-1015,-140] 
Service class * sector (3)   -221 [-695,254] 
Service class * sector (5)   -429+ [-864,6] 
White collars * sector (1)    195 [-86,476] 
White collars * sector (2)   -275 [-723,174] 
White collars * sector (3)   -7 [-378,364] 
White collars * sector (5)   42 [-331,415] 
Self-employed * sector (1)    -305 [-714,104] 
Self-employed * sector (2)   -668** [-1138,-198] 
Self-employed * sector (3)   -401+ [-842,40] 
Self-employed * sector (5)   -285 [-734,163] 
Farmers * sector (1)   -149 [-570,272] 
Farmers * sector (2)   -330 [-788,128] 
Farmers * sector (3)   -467* [-892,-41] 
Farmers * sector (5)   -374+ [-797,50] 
Agric. Laborers * sector (1)    -239 [-682,204] 
Agric. Laborers * sector (2)   -112 [-613,390] 
Agric. Laborers * sector (3)   -355 [-811,102] 
Agric. Laborers * sector (5)   -98 [-553,357] 
_cons 1044** [883,1205] 924** [760,1088] 
N 2189  2189  
pseudo R2     
Controlling for education and gender 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 10: Summary of Main Results 
 
 Direct effect 
of class of 
origin? 
Does it decline 
over time 
Smaller effect 
for university 
graduates? 
Trends in returns to 
education 
Mechanisms 
    Relative absolute Field of 
study 
Grades Modes of 
finding a job 
Conditional 
effect by 
sector  
Short Answer Yes No, if 
something it 
increases 
No, higher 
effect for 
income 
Decline Decline No No No Yes 
Effect size          
Access to service class: 
All 
Men 25-48 
 
13% 
23% 
  
13% 
      
Income:  
All 
Men 25-48 
 
 
145 € 
213 € 
  
325€ 
      
Reference to table Table 2aB, 
models 1 
and 2 
Table 3 and 4 Table 5 
and 6abcd 
Table 3 Table 5 Table 7 Table 8 Table 8 Table 8 
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Appendix 1 descriptive statistics 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 shows the distributions by class of origins, education and class of destination for the 
analytical sample of people aged 28-65 in 2006 based on the CIS 2634 survey. It also presents 
descriptive statistics for the ISEI and net monthly labour earnings. 
 
App. Table 1 Descriptive statistics for class of origin, class of destination and education, people age 
28-65 in 2006  (CIS 2634) 
 
Class (current or last job)EGP codes  
Service class (I-II) 20.0 
White collars (IIIa) 17.6 
Self-employed (IVab) 14.1 
Farmers (IVc) 2.7 
Working class (V-VI-VIIa and IIIb) 42.8 
Agricultural workers 2.8 
    N=(4,283)           100.0 
Class of origin  
Service class (I-II) 8.6 
White collars (IIIa) 6.0 
Self-employed (IVab) 16.8 
Farmers (IVc) 14.7 
Urban working class (V-VI-VIIa and IIIb) 42.0 
Agricultural workers 11.9 
 (N=4,318)           100.0 
Education most detailed classification  
Illiterate 0.9 
Able to read and write, no schooling 3.1 
Uncompleted Primary  2.2 
Primary 17.9 
Lower secondary 28.3 
Upper secondary 11.4 
Lower vocational training 6.9 
Higher vocational training 8.6 
Tertiary education, short degree 9.2 
Tertiary education, long degree 10.5 
Tertiary masters and doctoral studies 1.0 
 (N=4,553)            100.0 
ISEI (average/s.d.) 41.2 / 16.8 
Net monthly labour earnings (average) 1282.3 / 775.7 
 
 
The information on field of study is available for those who have completed lower or higher 
vocational training and for tertiary education graduates. The survey distinguishes across 21 field of 
studies that combined with the different levels of vocational training (low and high) and tertiary 
education (short, long, master and doctoral studies) make for 79 valid combinations of level and field 
of studies. Appendix table 2 presents the distribution of the new variable level of education by level of 
study (where the distinction by field of study applies). 
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App. Table 2: level of education and field of study, people age 28-65 in 2006  (CIS 2634) 
 
Level of education and field of study   
Illiterate 33 0.7 
writing and reading, no school 141 3.1 
Uncompleted primary 100 2.2 
Primary 813 17.9 
lower secondary 1,287 28.3 
Upper secondary 520 11.4 
Low vocational training education 3 0.1 
political science 2 0.0 
business 66 1.5 
biology 4 0.1 
computer science 3 0.1 
mechanics 53 1.2 
buildings 4 0.1 
Agriculture 4 0.1 
medicine 29 0.6 
Social work 2 0.0 
Personal services 14 0.3 
No field of study 131 2.9 
High vocational training education   
Education 1 0.0 
Arts 6 0.1 
humanities 1 0.0 
Social sciences 1 0.0 
journalism 1 0.0 
Business 102 2.2 
biology 11 0.2 
computer science 7 0.2 
Engenering 3 0.1 
Mechanical engeneering 93 2.0 
Architecture 2 0.0 
Agriculture 1 0.0 
Medice 19 0.4 
Social work 2 0.0 
Personal services 2 0.0 
No field of study 141 3.1 
University short degree   
education 99 2.2 
Arts 6 0.1 
Humanities 9 0.2 
Social Sciences 23 0.5 
journalism 3 0.1 
business 56 1.2 
Law 8 0.2 
Biology 4 0.1 
Phisics 1 0.0 
mathematics 1 0.0 
computer science 6 0.1 
Engeneering 45 1.0 
Mechanical engeneering 6 0.1 
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Level of education and field of study   
Architecture 12 0.3 
Agriculture 1 0.0 
medicine 40 0.9 
Social work 14 0.3 
no field of study 85 1.9 
University long  degree   
education 26 0.6 
Arts 16 0.4 
Humanities 58 1.3 
Social Sciences 33 0.7 
journalism 22 0.5 
business 55 1.2 
Law 58 1.3 
Biology 33 0.7 
Phisics 10 0.2 
mathematics 12 0.3 
computer science 6 0.1 
Engeneering 32 0.7 
Mechanical engeneering 1 0.0 
Architecture 9 0.2 
Agriculture 1 0.0 
veterinary 4 0.1 
medicine 15 0.3 
Social work 2 0.0 
no field of study 85 1.9 
University master/phd   
education 3 0.1 
Arts 2 0.0 
Humanities 6 0.1 
Social Sciences 2 0.0 
business 5 0.1 
Law 4 0.1 
Biology 4 0.1 
Phisics 1 0.0 
mathematics 1 0.0 
Engeneering 4 0.1 
Architecture 2 0.0 
Agriculture 1 0.0 
medicine 5 0.1 
no field of study 6 0.1 
 4,553 100.0 
 
Information on performance at school was collected by means of a retrospective question, so the 
respondants were asked about their grades at school when they were 16 or so (or before, if you had 
already dropped out). The precoded answer included five categories: very good, good, not good, bad 
or very bad. App. Table 3 shows the distribution of this variable.  
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App. Table 3: grades at school when respondent was about 16 years old 
 
Grades were…  
Very good 10.3 
Good 39.5 
not good 34.6 
Bad 6.9 
very bad 1.2 
no answer 1.5 
Total  (N=4553)      100.0 
 
 
Those who are employed were also asked about how they found their current job. Seven alternatives 
were conceived: through personal contacts, applying to a publicly advertised vacancy, through an 
employment agency, public competition for the public administration, the job is in a family business, 
she created her own firm/job, other. App. Table 4 presents the distribution for this variable 
  
App. Table 4: modality for finding the current job; people age 28-65 in 2006  (CIS 2634) 
 
Way in which the job was found  
through personal contacts 38.2 
Applying to a publicly advertised vacancy 14.6 
through an employment agency 4.7 
public competition for the public administration 17.1 
the job is in a family business 6.0 
she created her own firm/job 15.1 
 Other 3.8 
don't know 0.1 
now answer 0.4 
Total (N=2976) 100.0 
  
 
Finally the sector of employment is recorded using a national classification that distinguishes among 
32 sectors. The main interest lies in identifying those sectors where social and communicative skills 
might play a more important role in occupational attainment. Following the coding used in Mastekaasa 
(2001) I have thus where social skills are likely to be more important as cultural activities, hotels, 
financial services, consulting, advertisement and other services to firms. I have then recoded the 
original variable in 5 categories: public sector, agriculture, industry, services with high demand for 
social skills and other services (education, social services, retail, personal services). App. Table 5 
presents the distribution for the variable sector of employment. 
 
 
App. Table 5: sector of employment, current or last occupation; 
people age 28-65 in 2006  (CIS 2634) 
 
Sector of employment  
Public sector 36.5 
agriculture 5.8 
Industry 20.1 
Social skills sector 12.6 
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Other services 25.0 
 
Total (N=4302) 100.0 
 
Finally appendix table 6 presents the distribution of average net montly labour income and its standard 
deviation by sector of employment 
 
 
App. Table 6: average net monthly income and standard deviation by 
sector of employment, employed people age 28-65 in 2006  (CIS 2634) 
 
Sector of employment Mean SD N 
Public sector 1437 675 1003 
agriculture 956 537 142 
Industry 1309 718 442 
Social skills sector 1346 1026 292 
Other services 1059 823 573 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Description of the social mobility surveys 
 
Appendix Table 2.1 presents an overview of the mobility surveys used in the analysis of change over 
time of the direct effect of social origin. 
 
 
Appendix Table 2.1: description of Spanish mobility surveys 
 
 N Class Education Class of origin 
CIS 1737 
1988 
 
27,377 3 digits national classification 
1979, roughly equivalent to ISCO 
68   
No category for vocational 
training 
3 digits national 
classification 1979, 
roughly equivalent 
to ISCO 68  
Father’s occupation 
only;  when the 
respondent was 
about 16 years 
CIS 1789 
1989 
 
27,287 3 digits national classification 
1979, roughly equivalent to ISCO 
68 
No distinction between primary 
and primary not completed  
3 digits national 
classification 1979, 
roughly equivalent 
to ISCO 68  
Father’s occupation 
only;  no reference 
to age 
SD 1991 
 
157,100 3 digits national classification 
made ad hoc for this survey  
There might be some mess 
between categories at lower 
education. 
3 digits national 
classification made 
ad hoc for this 
survey Father’s 
occupation when the 
respondent was 16; 
if father is missing 
than mother’s 
Fabrizio Bernardi 
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occupation  
ASEP 
1990-1996 
62,398 26 categories; only for those 
employed at the time of the survey 
 26 categories 
Father’s occupation. 
No reference to age. 
ASEP 
1996-1999 
 
38,839  26 categories It is not clear where EGB goes (it 
seems that part of EGB goes into 
primary) 
26 categories 
Father’s occupation. 
No reference to age.  
EU-SILC 
2005 
 
28,829  2  digits ISCO No distinction between primary 
and primary not completed 
Vocational training is divided 
between lower secondary and 
upper secondary 
Father’s occupation 
when respondent 
was 12-16 years old.  
CIS2634 
2006 
 
7,671 3 digits CNO-94, roughly 
equivalent to ISCO 88 
 Father’s occupation 
when the respondent 
was 16. If father 
missing than the 
mother or other head 
of the household 
 
The table makes clear that the original coding of own and father’s occupation and own education vary 
from one survey to another. This variability raises the issue of whether it is legitimate to compare the 
direct effect of class of origin on occupational success over and above the effect of education, across 
surveys. Can we exclude that the observed variations in the direct effect of class of origin simply 
reflect measurement differences across surveys? 
 
In order to address this question, I have compared the distribution of the class of origin for the same 
birth cohort across surveys. In principle since the class of origin is fixed the distribution of the class of 
origin for the same cohort should not vary across cohort. I have also repeated the same exercise for the 
distribution of own achieved education and of own class, although in this case the distribution might 
change due to adult education and intragenerational mobility, respectively. App. Table 2 reports the 
results of the exercise for the class of origin distribution for the cohort of birth 1940-1949. 
 
App. Table2.2: class of origin distribution for the cohort of birth 1940-1949 in different surveys 
 
         |                                    year2 
   clorig6 |  CIS 1988   CIS 1989  ASEP1990-96  SD1991  ASEP1996-99 EUSILC2005   CIS2006 |     Total 
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      i-ii | 266.71508  234.47565  495.75054  1,181.589 270.491417  146.83013  45.482366 | 2,641.334  
           |      6.26       5.57       6.09       6.48       5.89       4.66       5.28 |      6.08  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     iiiab | 204.39569  242.66897  378.60194  646.25033  169.34254  219.55369 25.3689482 |1,886.1821  
           |      4.80       5.77       4.65       3.54       3.69       6.97       2.94 |      4.34  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      ivab | 604.98446   627.4412  904.59211  2,613.565  500.26231    371.308  136.67588 | 5,758.829  
           |     14.21      14.91      11.12      14.34      10.90      11.79      15.85 |     13.26  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
       ivc | 991.09311  995.37019  1,969.181  4,417.302  1,004.351  662.90179  214.22627 | 10,254.43  
           |     23.28      23.65      24.20      24.23      21.88      21.05      24.85 |     23.61  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
    v-viia | 1,527.202 1,366.2389  3,134.112  6,375.818  1,808.034  1,096.991 290.104337 |  15,598.5  
           |     35.87      32.46      38.51      34.97      39.39      34.83      33.65 |     35.91  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
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      viib | 663.08164  742.72603  1,255.713  2,995.634  837.38421 651.907317  150.28356 |  7,296.73  
           |     15.57      17.65      15.43      16.43      18.24      20.70      17.43 |     16.80  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total | 4,257.472  4,208.921  8,137.952  18,230.16  4,589.865  3,149.492  862.14137 |    43,436  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
 
The distribution for CIS 2006 and the SD 1991 but also for CIS 1988 and CIS 1989 are almost 
identical, while the ASEP surveys and EU-SILD tend to underestimate the small employers. Overall, 
however, the degree of similarity of the distribution is high and reassuring. Next, Appendix table 2.3 
presents the same exercise but for the respondent’s level of education. In this case the differences 
across surveys are larger, especially for the first and last survey. The differences however mostly refer 
to the lower educational levels, while for the higher educational level, in particular for tertiary 
education, the distributions are similar. For the 1988 CIS part of the lower level vocational training is 
coded within lower secondary education and this explains the higher percentages of primary and lower 
secondary educated in that survey. In the most recent 2006 the lower percentage of those with 
uncompleted primary education can probably be explained if some of those with no primary education 
at the beginning of the 90s have attended some adult education course and completed it over the 
following 15 years.  
 
App. Table 2.3: level of education for the cohort of birth 1940-1949 in various surveys 
            |                         year2 
       edua |   CIS1988  ASEP1990-96   SD1991  ASEP1996-99  CIS2006 |     Total 
------------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
<PrimUn+Ill | 1,045.583   2,348.19  4,678.253 1,139.6767 148.014445 | 9,359.718  
            |     25.15      27.38      25.12      22.66      16.66 |     25.11  
------------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
Prim+LowSec | 2,503.295  4,505.816  10,262.55   2,837.51   527.1387 | 20,636.31  
            |     60.22      52.54      55.11      56.43      59.33 |     55.37  
------------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   UpSec+VT | 227.28645 855.456938   1,966.56  585.13069  118.39384 | 3,752.828  
            |      5.47       9.97      10.56      11.64      13.33 |     10.07  
------------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
   UniShort |241.613753  453.19201  904.00005  218.32844  44.636113 |  1,861.77  
            |      5.81       5.28       4.85       4.34       5.02 |      4.99  
------------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
    UniLong | 139.05323   414.0051  810.98529   248.0642  50.269697 | 1,662.378  
            |      3.35       4.83       4.35       4.93       5.66 |      4.46  
------------+-------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      Total | 4,156.832   8,576.66 18,622.346   5,028.71  888.45279 |    37,273  
            |    100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
 
 
App. Table 2.4 compares the percentages of those who are employed in the service class for the cohort 
1940-49 in various years. There are some differences across surveys, in particular the size of the 
service class seems to be overestimated in EU-SILC. However, the differences do not seem so large to 
prevent a comparison across surveys. Again, the differences between the SD and the CIS 2006 are 
negligible suggesting that the firmer and safer comparison should build on these two surveys only. 
 
App. Table 2.4: percentage of those employed in the service class (current or last occupation) for the 
cohort 1940-1949 in various surveys 
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        Yn |    CIS1988   CIS1989    SD1991   ASEP1996-99 EUSILC2005  CIS2006  |     Total 
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      else | 2,935.751  2,636.547   14,300.9    3,627.1  2,380.672  681.79173  | 30,237.19  
           |     89.05      89.31    86.68      89.02      83.05      86.84    |     86.75  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      I-II | 360.83977  315.62745   2,196.909  447.19594 485.892324  103.33197 |4,617.8123  
           |     10.95      10.69    13.32      10.98      16.95      13.16    |     13.25  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total | 3,296.591  2,952.174  4,382.438  16,497.81  4,074.296  2,866.564   785.1237 |    34,855  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
 
 
Finally App. Table 2.5 is the same as Table 2.4 but only for those who are employed at the time of the 
survey. With this selection it is also possible to consider the ASEP surveys 1990-1996 that provides 
consistent estimates with the other surveys.  
 
App. Table 2.5: percentage of those employed in the service class (current occupation) for the cohort 
1940-1949 in various surveys 
           |                                    year2 
Yn         |  CIS 1988   CIS 1989  ASEP1990-96  SD1991  ASEP1996-99 EUSILC2005   CIS2006 |     Total 
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      else | 1,899.535  1,868.066  3,734.494  9,528.002   1,975.31  1,196.286 253.713864 | 20,455.41  
           |     85.76      87.14      83.84      82.53      84.34      78.38      83.52 |     83.39  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
      I-II | 315.49035  275.66959  719.59118  2,017.071  366.79849  329.92694  50.044453 | 4,074.592  
           |     14.24      12.86      16.16      17.47      15.66      21.62      16.48 |     16.61  
-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+---------- 
     Total | 2,215.026  2,143.736  4,454.085  11,545.07  2,342.108  1,526.213 303.758317 |    24,530  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
 
The main conclusions of these checks is that, with the exception of EU-SILC, the measurement of 
occupational class and education is fairly consistent across surveys. This is particularly true for the SD 
1991 and CIS 2006 surveys. It seems therefore legitimate to interpret variations across surveys in the 
direct effect of social origin as truly reflecting change over time in the effect of interest and not simply 
variations in its measurement. 
 
Appendix 3 
Additional tables and sensitivity checks 
 
 
Appendix Table 3.1: quantile regression on income by gender, education (e), class of origin (c) and 
cohort of birth (b). Note: c1 service class, c2=white collars, c3=self-employed, c4=farmers c5=urban 
working class (ref. category), c6=agricultural labourers; e1=primary education, 2=lower secondary 
(ref.category), e3=lower vocational training, e4=upper secondary, e5=upper vocational training, 
e6=short university, e7=long university; b2=cohort 1940-49 (ref. category), b3=1950-59, b4=60-69, 
b5=1970-79 
 
 
Simultaneous quantile regression                     Number of obs =      2211 
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  bootstrap(100) SEs                                 .10 Pseudo R2 =    0.1534 
                                                     .25 Pseudo R2 =    0.1640 
                                                     .50 Pseudo R2 =    0.1933 
                                                     .75 Pseudo R2 =    0.1894 
                                                     .90 Pseudo R2 =    0.2074 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Bootstrap 
      income |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q10          | 
         sex |        375   28.11571    13.34   0.000     319.8638    430.1362 
          e1 |       -150   43.46148    -3.45   0.001    -235.2299   -64.77007 
          e3 |         50    48.2751     1.04   0.300    -44.66965    144.6697 
          e4 |        100   46.64215     2.14   0.032     8.532634    191.4674 
          e5 |        125   36.60107     3.42   0.001     53.22365    196.7764 
          e6 |        225   38.18124     5.89   0.000     150.1249    299.8751 
          e7 |        350   65.75476     5.32   0.000     221.0519    478.9481 
          c1 |         25   63.26851     0.40   0.693    -99.07242    149.0724 
          c2 |        -50   68.03202    -0.73   0.462    -183.4139    83.41387 
          c3 |   9.40e-13    40.5045     0.00   1.000    -79.43116    79.43116 
          c4 |        -75   36.40361    -2.06   0.039    -146.3891   -3.610863 
          c6 |        -25   28.49386    -0.88   0.380    -80.87775    30.87775 
          b3 |        -50   53.48617    -0.93   0.350    -154.8888     54.8888 
          b4 |       -100   54.81682    -1.82   0.068    -207.4983    7.498275 
          b5 |       -125   57.04038    -2.19   0.029    -236.8588   -13.14124 
       _cons |        500   55.79341     8.96   0.000     390.5866    609.4134 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q25          | 
         sex |        330   24.12155    13.68   0.000     282.6966    377.3034 
          e1 |       -127   32.52576    -3.90   0.000    -190.7845   -63.21551 
          e3 |         90   33.56774     2.68   0.007     24.17215    155.8279 
          e4 |        123   37.93134     3.24   0.001     48.61493    197.3851 
          e5 |        140   31.70508     4.42   0.000      77.8249    202.1751 
          e6 |        320    48.7244     6.57   0.000     224.4492    415.5508 
          e7 |        520      40.38    12.88   0.000      440.813     599.187 
          c1 |         50   49.57101     1.01   0.313    -47.21101     147.211 
          c2 |        -30   61.50575    -0.49   0.626    -150.6156    90.61556 
          c3 |         50   31.10562     1.61   0.108    -10.99953    110.9995 
          c4 |        -60   31.79115    -1.89   0.059    -122.3439    2.343883 
          c6 |        -60   29.75483    -2.02   0.044    -118.3506   -1.649421 
          b3 |        -40    44.6397    -0.90   0.370    -127.5405    47.54047 
          b4 |        -77   43.18679    -1.78   0.075    -161.6912    7.691246 
          b5 |       -147   42.60134    -3.45   0.001    -230.5432   -63.45684 
       _cons |        677   44.38475    15.25   0.000     589.9595    764.0405 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q50          | 
         sex |        375   21.99529    17.05   0.000     331.8662    418.1338 
          e1 |       -125   28.35164    -4.41   0.000    -180.5988   -69.40116 
          e3 |        100    43.5954     2.29   0.022     14.50745    185.4925 
          e4 |        250   36.11537     6.92   0.000     179.1761    320.8239 
          e5 |        225    41.3399     5.44   0.000     143.9306    306.0694 
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          e6 |        425   39.73816    10.70   0.000     347.0717    502.9283 
          e7 |        775   36.57525    21.19   0.000     703.2743    846.7257 
          c1 |         75    41.2104     1.82   0.069    -5.815459    155.8155 
          c2 |        -75   48.68915    -1.54   0.124    -170.4816    20.48163 
          c3 |         50   30.06575     1.66   0.096    -8.960289    108.9603 
          c4 |        -50   27.58887    -1.81   0.070     -104.103    4.103027 
          c6 |        -75   33.27933    -2.25   0.024    -140.2623   -9.737716 
          b3 |        -50   34.35662    -1.46   0.146    -117.3749    17.37489 
          b4 |       -100   38.13773    -2.62   0.009    -174.7898   -25.21019 
          b5 |       -225   36.99467    -6.08   0.000    -297.5482   -152.4518 
       _cons |        875   41.53995    21.06   0.000     793.5383    956.4617 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q75          | 
         sex |        480   27.84954    17.24   0.000     425.3858    534.6142 
          e1 |       -225   46.37529    -4.85   0.000     -315.944    -134.056 
          e3 |         25   41.05471     0.61   0.543    -55.51015    105.5102 
          e4 |        220   58.17113     3.78   0.000     105.9238    334.0762 
          e5 |        220   48.52236     4.53   0.000     124.8455    315.1545 
          e6 |        520   52.34212     9.93   0.000     417.3547    622.6453 
          e7 |        925   98.24886     9.41   0.000     732.3295     1117.67 
          c1 |        160   70.28853     2.28   0.023       22.161     297.839 
          c2 |   8.31e-12   78.92538     0.00   1.000    -154.7762    154.7762 
          c3 |        175   49.92443     3.51   0.000     77.09593    272.9041 
          c4 |        -20   35.04787    -0.57   0.568    -88.73046    48.73046 
          c6 |        -65   44.84664    -1.45   0.147    -152.9463     22.9463 
          b3 |        -45   65.39925    -0.69   0.491    -173.2509    83.25089 
          b4 |        -85   63.31523    -1.34   0.180     -209.164    39.16404 
          b5 |       -285   62.29945    -4.57   0.000    -407.1721   -162.8279 
       _cons |       1085   62.57073    17.34   0.000      962.296    1207.704 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
q90          | 
         sex |        600   54.91882    10.93   0.000     492.3017    707.6983 
          e1 |       -200   87.47669    -2.29   0.022    -371.5458   -28.45425 
          e3 |  -8.61e-12   97.05865    -0.00   1.000    -190.3364    190.3364 
          e4 |        225   117.1177     1.92   0.055    -4.673163    454.6732 
          e5 |        225   101.6091     2.21   0.027     25.73987    424.2601 
          e6 |        500   78.46847     6.37   0.000     346.1198    653.8802 
          e7 |       1300   192.1385     6.77   0.000     923.2076    1676.792 
          c1 |        400    158.539     2.52   0.012     89.09778    710.9022 
          c2 |         48   115.6764     0.41   0.678    -178.8467    274.8467 
          c3 |        325   119.5418     2.72   0.007      90.5732    559.4268 
          c4 |        -75   74.77361    -1.00   0.316    -221.6344    71.63445 
          c6 |       -100   71.79566    -1.39   0.164    -240.7945    40.79455 
          b3 |        -25   131.7318    -0.19   0.849    -283.3319    233.3319 
          b4 |       -100   118.0911    -0.85   0.397     -331.582     131.582 
          b5 |       -375   122.6781    -3.06   0.002    -615.5773   -134.4227 
       _cons |       1375   133.1356    10.33   0.000     1113.915    1636.085 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.2: class of origin effect on log(income); controlling also for cohort birth 
 
 (1) (3) (4) 
 All Men 28-45 Women 28-45 
Gender (male=1) 0.41**   
 (0.02)   
Education    
Primary or less -0.20** -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) 
Lower secondary. (ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lower vocational training  0.10** 0.02 0.15* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Upper secondary 0.17** 0.10+ 0.21** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
Upper vocational training  0.19** 0.16** 0.20** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
University short 0.36** 0.22** 0.52** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
University long 0.56** 0.40** 0.63** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
Class of origin    
Service class 0.08* 0.06 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
White collars -0.02 -0.07 0.10 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Self-employed  0.08* 0.08+ 0.09 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
Farmers -0.03 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
Urban working class (Ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.05+ -0.06 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 6.71** 7.05** 6.51** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
N 2211 859 638 
pseudo R2 0.33 0.13 0.24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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App. Tab. 3.3: ordered logit on 10 ordered categories of income, controlling for gender and cohort model (1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Men 28-45 Women 28-45 
Education    
Primary or less -0.73** -0.58* -0.25 
 (0.13) (0.26) (0.32) 
Lower secondary. (ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lower vocational training  0.44** 0.17 0.71** 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.25) 
Upper secondary 0.83** 0.75** 0.93** 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.25) 
Upper vocational training  0.84** 0.84** 0.77** 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.24) 
University short 1.70** 1.23** 2.18** 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.26) 
University long 2.61** 1.94** 2.83** 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.28) 
Class of origin    
Service class 0.42** 0.33 0.30 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.25) 
White collars -0.12 -0.33 0.36 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.29) 
Self-employed 0.38** 0.42* 0.41+ 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.23) 
Farmers -0.14 -0.19 0.10 
 (0.12) (0.24) (0.22) 
Urban working class (Ref.) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.27* -0.18 -0.14 
 (0.14) (0.25) (0.23) 
cut1    
_cons -2.96** -4.39** -2.12** 
 (0.20) (0.39) (0.23) 
cut2    
_cons -1.23** -2.91** -0.33+ 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) 
cut3    
_cons 0.38* -1.00** 1.23** 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.19) 
cut4    
_cons 1.94** 0.66** 2.59** 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.21) 
cut5    
_cons 3.73** 2.38** 4.47** 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.29) 
cut6    
_cons 4.81** 3.34** 5.38** 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.33) 
cut7    
_cons 5.83** 4.22** 6.84** 
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 (0.22) (0.23) (0.53) 
cut8    
_cons 7.05** 5.51** 7.79** 
 (0.29) (0.37) (0.80) 
cut9    
_cons 7.94** 6.11** 8.36** 
 (0.40) (0.48) (1.08) 
N 2211 859 638 
pseudo R2 0.124 0.055 0.097 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
CIS (2006) 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 3.4: probability of accessing the service class in the first job, interactions between education and cohort and 
class of origin and cohort CIS2634 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Men Women 
Gender 0.00   
 [-0.00,0.01]   
Cohort of birth    
1.cohort (1930-39) -0.00 -0.01 0.04 
 [-0.07,0.06] [-0.10,0.07] [-0.06,0.13] 
2.cohort (1940-49) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] 
3.cohort (1950-59) -0.00 -0.04 0.02 
 [-0.05,0.04] [-0.09,0.02] [-0.02,0.07] 
4.cohort (1960-69) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
 [-0.04,0.04] [-0.07,0.05] [-0.02,0.05] 
5.cohort (1970-79) -0.03 -0.04 0.02 
 [-0.07,0.01] [-0.10,0.01] [-0.02,0.06] 
Education    
1.edu7 (primary) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 [-0.05,0.02] [-0.09,0.02] [-0.02,0.04] 
2b.edu7 (lower sec.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] 
3.edu7 (lower voc.) 0.04 -0.00 0.09 
 [-0.05,0.13] [-0.12,0.11] [-0.05,0.23] 
4.edu7 (upper sec.) 0.13* 0.16+ 0.08 
 [0.01,0.24] [-0.01,0.33] [-0.05,0.21] 
5.edu7 (upper voc.) 0.17+ 0.20+ -0.01 
 [-0.00,0.34] [-0.01,0.40] [-0.04,0.02] 
6.edu7 (short univ.) 0.62** 0.61** 0.63** 
 [0.47,0.77] [0.41,0.81] [0.41,0.86] 
7.edu7 (long univ.) 0.68** 0.61** 0.82** 
 [0.54,0.82] [0.45,0.77] [0.54,1.10] 
Cohort*education    
1.cohort#1.edu7 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 
 [-0.08,0.05] [-0.08,0.09] [-0.14,0.06] 
1.cohort#3.edu7 0.02 -0.03 0.06 
 [-0.19,0.22] [-0.16,0.10] [-0.33,0.46] 
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1.cohort#4.edu7 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 
 [-0.23,0.11] [-0.32,0.14] [-0.29,0.28] 
1.cohort#5.edu7 -0.01 -0.05 0.20 
 [-0.30,0.29] [-0.39,0.29] [-0.25,0.65] 
1.cohort#6.edu7 0.07 0.01 0.18 
 [-0.18,0.32] [-0.33,0.35] [-0.15,0.51] 
1.cohort#7.edu7 -0.24 -0.09 -0.92** 
 [-0.56,0.07] [-0.41,0.23] [-1.22,-0.62] 
3.cohort#1.edu7 0.01 0.05 -0.03 
 [-0.03,0.05] [-0.02,0.11] [-0.08,0.02] 
3.cohort#3.edu7 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
 [-0.13,0.09] [-0.12,0.10] [-0.22,0.14] 
3.cohort#4.edu7 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 
 [-0.16,0.10] [-0.28,0.09] [-0.14,0.19] 
3.cohort#5.edu7 -0.07 -0.10 0.08 
 [-0.27,0.13] [-0.34,0.15] [-0.08,0.24] 
3.cohort#6.edu7 -0.15 -0.26+ -0.08 
 [-0.34,0.04] [-0.52,0.00] [-0.36,0.19] 
3.cohort#7.edu7 -0.04 -0.01 -0.19 
 [-0.22,0.14] [-0.21,0.19] [-0.52,0.14] 
4.cohort#1.edu7 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03+ 
 [-0.05,0.02] [-0.06,0.06] [-0.07,0.01] 
4.cohort#3.edu7 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 [-0.13,0.08] [-0.14,0.10] [-0.19,0.13] 
4.cohort#4.edu7 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 
 [-0.22,0.04] [-0.30,0.06] [-0.20,0.10] 
4.cohort#5.edu7 -0.07 -0.09 0.10* 
 [-0.26,0.11] [-0.32,0.14] [0.00,0.20] 
4.cohort#6.edu7 -0.22* -0.24* -0.19 
 [-0.40,-0.04] [-0.48,-0.00] [-0.44,0.07] 
4.cohort#7.edu7 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 
 [-0.23,0.09] [-0.26,0.11] [-0.42,0.18] 
5.cohort#1.edu7 0.04 0.02 0.07 
 [-0.02,0.11] [-0.04,0.08] [-0.08,0.21] 
5.cohort#3.edu7 -0.00 0.04 -0.06 
 [-0.11,0.10] [-0.09,0.16] [-0.22,0.10] 
5.cohort#4.edu7 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 
 [-0.22,0.03] [-0.28,0.08] [-0.20,0.09] 
5.cohort#5.edu7 -0.02 -0.06 0.17** 
 [-0.21,0.16] [-0.29,0.16] [0.07,0.27] 
5.cohort#6.edu7 -0.17+ -0.18 -0.15 
 [-0.35,0.00] [-0.42,0.06] [-0.41,0.10] 
5.cohort#7.edu7 -0.15+ -0.02 -0.31* 
 [-0.31,0.02] [-0.21,0.17] [-0.61,-0.01] 
Class of origin    
1.clorig6 (service class) 0.01 0.11** 0.05 
 [-0.11,0.13] [0.04,0.18] [-0.02,0.13] 
2.clorig6 (white collars) 0.07 0.02 0.05 
 [-0.11,0.24] [-0.06,0.09] [-0.02,0.12] 
3.clorig6 (small employers) 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 [-0.05,0.08] [-0.02,0.05] [-0.03,0.04] 
4.clorig6 (farmers) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
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 [-0.05,0.03] [-0.03,0.02] [-0.03,0.03] 
5.clorig6 (working class) Ref. Cat. 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] 
6.clorig6 (agric. labourers) -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 
 [-0.06,0.02] [-0.03,0.03] [-0.04,0.02] 
Cohort * class of origin    
1.cohort#1.clorig6 0.09   
 [-0.13,0.31]   
1.cohort#2.clorig6 0.03   
 [-0.25,0.32]   
1.cohort#3.clorig6 0.00   
 [-0.09,0.09]   
1.cohort#4.clorig6 0.01   
 [-0.04,0.06]   
1.cohort#6.clorig6 0.03   
 [-0.02,0.07]   
3.cohort#1.clorig6 0.03   
 [-0.13,0.20]   
3.cohort#2.clorig6 -0.15   
 [-0.36,0.06]   
3.cohort#3.clorig6 -0.04   
 [-0.13,0.04]   
3.cohort#4.clorig6 -0.00   
 [-0.06,0.06]   
3.cohort#6.clorig6 0.02   
 [-0.04,0.08]   
4.cohort#1.clorig6 0.07   
 [-0.08,0.22]   
4.cohort#2.clorig6 -0.04   
 [-0.24,0.15]   
4.cohort#3.clorig6 -0.02   
 [-0.10,0.06]   
4.cohort#4.clorig6 -0.00   
 [-0.07,0.06]   
4.cohort#6.clorig6 -0.00   
 [-0.07,0.06]   
5.cohort#1.clorig6 0.12   
 [-0.04,0.27]   
5.cohort#2.clorig6 0.02   
 [-0.18,0.22]   
5.cohort#3.clorig6 0.02   
 [-0.06,0.11]   
5.cohort#4.clorig6 -0.00   
 [-0.08,0.08]   
5.cohort#6.clorig6 0.06   
 [-0.02,0.13]   
_cons 0.02 0.05+ 0.01 
 [-0.01,0.06] [-0.00,0.10] [-0.02,0.04] 
N 4330 2313 2017 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Appendix 3.5 abcd: class of origin effect on the chances of access to he service class, avoiding the working class, income 
and ISEI, conditional to the level of education, men aged 28-45; CIS 2634 (2006);  
 
Panel A: Access to the service 
class 
(2) (3) (4) (5)  
Linear probability model 
 
Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 0.25+ 0.25** 0.23+ 0.14+ 0.20** 
 [-0.01,0.51] [0.06,0.43] [-0.02,0.47] [-0.02,0.30] [0.08,0.33] 
White collars 0.06 0.17+ 0.09 -0.14 -0.04 
 [-0.05,0.17] [-0.00,0.35] [-0.24,0.41] [-0.38,0.11] [-0.23,0.16] 
Self-employed 0.00 0.06 0.11 -0.11 -0.01 
 [-0.03,0.04] [-0.05,0.16] [-0.15,0.36] [-0.32,0.10] [-0.17,0.15] 
Farmers 0.02 -0.01 -0.32 -0.11 -0.16 
 [-0.02,0.07] [-0.14,0.12] [-0.79,0.15] [-0.48,0.25] [-0.46,0.15] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.01 0.10 -0.07 0.26** -0.05 
 [-0.03,0.02] [-0.11,0.32] [-0.61,0.47] [0.13,0.39] [-0.49,0.40] 
Constant 0.02* 0.10** 0.57** 0.74** 0.66** 
 [0.00,0.03] [0.05,0.16] [0.42,0.72] [0.61,0.87] [0.56,0.75] 
N 571 284 105 173 278 
 
Panel B: avoiding working 
class 
(2) (3) (4) (5)  
Linear probability model  Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 0.29+ 0.28** 0.22** 0.05 0.13** 
 [-0.00,0.58] [0.08,0.48] [0.09,0.35] [-0.05,0.15] [0.04,0.21] 
White collars 0.21* 0.40** 0.13 0.02 0.08 
 [0.01,0.41] [0.22,0.58] [-0.08,0.35] [-0.12,0.15] [-0.04,0.19] 
Self-employed 0.23** 0.26** 0.13 -0.03 0.05 
 [0.12,0.35] [0.11,0.41] [-0.04,0.31] [-0.17,0.11] [-0.06,0.16] 
Farmers 0.27** 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
 [0.15,0.39] [-0.13,0.31] [-0.49,0.43] [-0.29,0.21] [-0.24,0.21] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural working class -0.06 0.04 -0.28 0.09* -0.24 
 [-0.15,0.04] [-0.22,0.30] [-0.81,0.25] [0.00,0.17] [-0.68,0.21] 
Constant 0.22** 0.35** 0.78** 0.91** 0.85** 
 [0.17,0.27] [0.26,0.44] [0.65,0.91] [0.83,1.00] [0.77,0.92] 
N 571 284 105 173 278 
 
Panel C: Income 
(2) (3) (4) (5)  
OLS 
 
Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class -62 -0 -2 582* 477* 
 [-346,221] [-301,301] [-291,288] [65,1099] [93,860] 
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White collars 43 -86 -255+ -343* -281** 
 [-251,337] [-348,176] [-512,1] [-649,-37] [-488,-74] 
Self-employed 151 103 224 451 374+ 
 [-132,435] [-128,333] [-295,742] [-160,1062] [-38,785] 
Farmers -9 24 198 -422+ -172 
 [-248,231] [-270,318] [-158,555] [-920,76] [-530,186] 
Urban working class (ref.) 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural working class -118 167 -288 103 -261 
 [-302,66] [-340,674] [-661,84] [-93,299] [-631,110] 
Constant 1263** 1418** 1552** 1797** 1672** 
 [1149,1377] [1301,1536] [1379,1724] [1601,1993] [1542,1802] 
N 427 210 93 129 222 
 
Panel D: ISEI 
(2) (3) (4) (5)  
OLS 
 
Primary/ 
Low sec. 
/Low Voc. 
Upper sec. 
/Upper Voc. 
University 
short 
University 
Long 
University 
Class of origin      
Service class 7+ 11** 10** 4+ 8** 
 [-0,14] [6,17] [3,16] [-1,9] [4,12] 
White collars 2 7** 8* -3 2 
 [-3,7] [3,12] [1,15] [-10,4] [-3,7] 
Self-employed 3* 5** 6 -1 2 
 [0,5] [1,9] [-1,13] [-8,5] [-3,7] 
Farmers -3** -1 -11 -2 -3 
 [-5,-1] [-6,4] [-29,8] [-15,11] [-15,8] 
Working class (ref.) 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural working class -3* 4 -7 7** -7 
 [-5,-0] [-4,11] [-31,16] [3,11] [-27,13] 
Constant 34** 39** 54** 64** 59** 
 [33,35] [37,41] [50,59] [60,68] [56,62] 
N 571 285 105 173 278 
 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
